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ANTITRUST LAW AND PATENT MISCONDUCT IN THE
PROPRIETARY DRUG INDUSTRY
MICHAEL A. SANzo*
T HIS Article examines the operation of antitrust law in an indus-
try dominated by patented products, the proprietary pharma-
ceutical industry. Section I examines four categories of patent
misconduct addressed by antitrust law: (1) the acquisition of pat-
ents by fraud, sometimes termed "patent abuse,"' (2) illegal "tying
arrangements" in which a patent holder extends his monopoly by
coupling the sale of a patented invention to the purchase of unpat-
ented goods; 2 (3) anticompetitive restrictions in patent licenses;3
and (4) improper patent acquisitions and cross-licensing agree-
ments.4 In each category, a specific example is presented. Sections
II and III of this Article discuss the limitations of antitrust law and
suggest alternative ways in which the law can be used to promote
competition between proprietary drug products.
I. ANTITRUST LAW AS A DETERRENT TO PATENT MISCONDUCT
A. The Acquisition of Patents by Fraud
Patents are state sanctioned monopolies5 granted to "promote
the Progress of Science and the useful Arts." 6 Inventors who have
* B.S. 1977, University of Maryland; Ph.D. 1981, Albany Medical College;J.D.
cum laude 1991, St. Louis University School of Law. At present, he is an associate
attorney in the intellectual property/technical litigation section of the Washing-
ton, D.C. office of Vinson & Elkins. The views expressed herein are solely those of
the author and are not necessarily those of Vinson & Elkins or of any other organi-
zation with which the author is affiliated.
1. For a discussion and examples of "patent abuse" as a defense to a claim of
patent infringement, see infra notes 5-38 and accompanying text.
2. For a detailed explanation of the elements of a tying arrangement as well as
some illustrative examples, see infra notes 39-84 and accompanying text.
3. For an analysis of the elements establishing the validity of license restric-
tions, see infra notes 85-122 and accompanying text.
4. For a discussion of the various patent/license combinations and their con-
sequences, see infra notes 123-44 and accompanying text.
5. The word "monopoly" as used in this context means exclusivity. It should
be distinguished from "monopoly" as used in the antitrust context which means, in
essence, market power.
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. In its entirety, Article I, § 8, clause 8 states:
"To promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries." Id. "Patent" is defined as "[a] grant of some privilege, property,
or authority, made by the government or sovereign of a country to one or more
(1209)
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acquired and maintained patents in good faith are immune from
antitrust laws. Antitrust immunity is lost, however, when a patent is
procured by fraud 7 or when a patentee attempts to enforce a patent
that he or she knows to be invalid.8
In Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical
Corp.,9 the United States Supreme Court held that patent holders
are subject to antitrust claims under section 2 of the Sherman Act' 0
individuals .... A grant of right to exclude others from making, using or selling
one's invention and includes right to license others to make, use or sell it."
BLACK's LAw DIcTIONARY 1125 (6th ed. 1990) (citation omitted).
7. See, e.g., Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382
U.S. 172 (1965). Walker Process dealt with alleged patent fraud. Id. at 173. Food
Machinery had sued Walker Process for infringement of a patent on a particular
piece of sewage treatment equipment. Id. Food Machinery subsequently filed a
motion to dismiss the suit due to the expiration of the patent. Id. Walker Process,
who originally denied any wrongdoing, counterclaimed, alleging that Food Ma-
chinery had obtained the patent by knowingly and willfully misrepresenting facts
to the Patent Office. Id. Specifically, Walker Process alleged that Food machinery
failed to reveal that its invention had been available to the United States public for
more than one year before it filed for a patent. Id. The Court held that, if true,
such conduct stripped Food Machinery of its immunity from antitrust laws. Id. at
177. Because the lower courts had granted the motion for dismissal, the Supreme
Court remanded the case to provide Walker Process with the opportunity to sub-
stantiate its claim of fraud. Id. at 178.
8. See, e.g., Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon Inc., 743 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1190 (1985). Handgards involved a patent for plastic gloves. Id. at
1285. In 1962, Ethicon filed an infringement suit against two predecessor compa-
nies of Handgards. Id. In 1968, the trial court found for Handgards, declaring
invalid one of the two patents involved. Id. The suit for infringement of the sec-
ond patent had been dropped prior to the trial court's ruling. Id. This verdict
notwithstanding, in 1968 Handgards filed an antitrust action against Ethicon. Id.
One of the theories of Handgards' suit was that Ethicon pursued its 1962 patent
infringement case in bad faith. Id. During the trial, Handgards provided evidence
that Ethicon had fabricated invention dates, that the invention was available for
public use more than one year prior to the filing of Ethicon's patent application,
and that Ethicon pursued the infringement litigation despite knowledge that such
public use invalidates a patent. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding of bad faith, stating that
"Ethicon's antitrust liability is premised upon its prosecution of a patent infringe-
ment suit with the knowledge that its patent was invalid." Id. at 1289. For further
discussion of the ways a patent holder can lose antitrust immunity, see ROBERT H.
BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADox, 352-55 (1978).
9. 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
10. Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, § 2, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version
at 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994)). Section 2 provides:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or com-
bine or conspire with any other person or persons to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and on conviction thereof,
shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or
if any other person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three
years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
2
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or section 4 of the Clayton Act" if two conditions are met:
(1) the relevant patent is shown to have been procured by
knowing and willful fraud practiced by the defendant on
the Patent Office or, if the defendant was not the original
patent applicant, he had been enforcing the patent with
knowledge of the fraudulent manner in which it was ob-
tained; and
(2) all the elements otherwise necessary to establish a § 2
monopolization charge are proved.1 2
To prevail in a Walker Process type claim, a plaintiff must show
that the defendant acted in bad faith in procuring or enforcing a
patent.13 Bad faith in procurement may take the form not only of
deliberate misrepresentation but also in a failure to disclose to the
Patent Office material information of which the applicant knew or
should have known. 14 A plaintiff alleging that a defendant failed to
11. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 4, 38 Stat. 731 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§ 15 (1994)). The relevant part of § 4 reads:
(a) Amount of recovery; prejudgment interest
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any person who
shall be injured by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may
sue therefor in any district court of the United States in the district in
which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect
to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by
him [or her] sustained, and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee ....
Id.
12. Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 179 (Harlan, J., concurring).
13. See Cataphote Corp. v. DeSoto Chem. Coatings Inc., 450 F.2d 769, 772
(9th Cir. 1971) (holding that in Walker Process type claim, "[g]ood faith is a com-
plete defense"), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 929 (1972). Bad faith, however, implies an
intent to mislead. In Cataphote, the Ninth Circuit stated: "The road to the Patent
Office is so tortuous and patent litigation is usually so complex, that 'knowing and
willful fraud' as the term is used in Walker, can mean no less than clear, convincing
proof of intentional fraud involving affirmative dishonesty ...." Id.; see also Con-
ceptual Eng'g Assocs., Inc. v. Aelectronic Bonding, Inc., 714 F. Supp. 1262, 1266-
67 (D.R.I. 1989) (reiterating that not only must patents be procured and main-
tained in good faith, but also that suits for patent infringement must be brought in
good faith).
.14. See Cataphote, 450 F.2d at 772 ("Wholly inadvertent errors or honest mis-
takes which are caused by neither fraudulent intent or design, nor by the paten-
tee's gross negligence, do not constitute fraud under Walker."). Although
inequitable conduct usually takes the form of misrepresentations or omissions in
acquiring a patent, it may take other forms as well. For example, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found a defendant violated the Sherman
Act by employing the patent examiner, who had reviewed the defendant's original
patent application, to assist in prosecuting a reissue application on the same pat-
ent. Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Giddings & Lewis, Inc., 452 F.2d 579, 585-89 (7th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1066 (1972). In Kearney, T. Emmert Beall was the
Primary Examiner of the Division receiving the original application for a patent on
Kearney's Brainard Machine. Id. at 585. Beall was involved in various capacities
3
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disclose material information must "offer clear and convincing
proof of: (1) prior art or information that is material; (2) knowl-
edge chargeable to applicant of that prior art or information and of
its materiality; and (3) failure of the applicant to disclose the art or
information resulting from an intent to mislead the [Patent and
Trademark Office] ."15
A distinction must be drawn between inequitable conduct that
is sufficient to result in a patent being held invalid 16 and inequita-
with this particular patent throughout the approval process, including signing ac-
tions from the Patent Office, interviewing Kearney representatives and considering
amendments to the application. Id. at 585-86. Beall retired shortly after he signed
the formal approval notice for the Brainard patent. Id. at 586. Less than two
months after his retirement from the Patent Office, Beall entered into a consulting
services contract with Kearney. Id. Throughout his employment, Beall advised
and worked with Kearney representatives in their claims for reissue applications on
original patents, including the Brainard patent. Id. The potential conflict was un-
covered by Kearney's attorney during the discovery phase of Kearney's suit against
Giddings & Lewis for patent infringement. Id. at 589. Kearney took corrective
actions upon this discovery, including limiting their patent infringement suit
against Giddings & Lewis and terminating Beall's employment. Id. at 589-90. Nev-
ertheless, the court found Kearney guilty of "deceptive intention" and Beall's ac-
tions "indefensible." Id. at 594, 597. Accordingly, the court held that Kearney
violated the Sherman Act through deceptive procurement and maintenance of the
Brainard patent. Id. at 599.
15. FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co., 835 F.2d 1411,1415 (Fed. Cir. 1987). FMC
demonstrates the varying claims and counterclaims possible in patent litigation.
FMC filed a suit seeking a declaratory judgment that its product did not infringe
on a Manitowoc owned patent and also that the Manitowoc patent was invalid. Id.
at 1412. Manitowoc subsequently filed an infringement suit against FMC who
counterclaimed with a suit alleging violation of the Sherman Act. Id. The court
found that Manitowoc believed in good faith that its infringement suit was not
frivolous. Id. at 1414. With respect to FMC's claim of material non-disclosure, the
court found that Manitowoc representatives provided the Patent and Trademark
Office with all of the information they believed to be material, and that no impro-
prieties occurred with respect to prior use of the product. Id. at 1416. The court
held that FMC failed to meet its burden of establishing inequitable conduct and,
therefore, no violation of antitrust law was found. Id. at 1418. Typically, charges of
fraud or patent misuse are made by defendants as counterclaims in patent in-
fringement actions. Courts have recognized that inventors who act in good faith in
acquiring patents should not be discouraged from enforcing their rights due to a
fear of antitrust sanctions. This recognition has produced the clear and convinc-
ing evidence standard. See Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon Inc., 601 F.2d 986, 996 (9th
Cir. 1979) (requiring "clear and convincing" standard in order to "provide reason-
able protection for the honest patentee who brings an infringement action"), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980); Conceptual Eng'g, 714 F. Supp. at 1266 (same).
16. Inequitable conduct offered as a defense in patent infringement cases can
be established by showing that the defendant made either intentional misrepresen-
tations or omissions of material information to the Patent Office. Smithkline Diag-
nostics v. Helena Lab. Corp., 859 F.2d 878, 891 (Fed. Cir. 1988). In this context,
"material information" is defined as any information which a patent examiner
would reasonably considered as important in evaluating a claim. See Precision In-
strument Mfg. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 818 (1945)
(indicating that public interest requires all relevant facts be submitted to Patent
Office); Argus Chem. Corp. v. Fibre Glass-Evercoat Co., 759 F.2d 10, 14-15 (Fed.
1212 [Vol. 39: p. 1209
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ble conduct that will support an antitrust claim. In the latter case, a
party asserting a claim under section 2 of the Sherman Act must,
among other things, identify the market affected by the alleged an-
titrust violation 17 and show a specific intent on the part of the de-
fendant to monopolize that market. 18 No monopolization occurs
under section 2 unless a defendant has market power.' 9 Moreover,
no attempt to monopolize occurs absent a "dangerous probability"
that the defendant will succeed in his or her attempt.20 Finally, the
Cir.) (acknowledging that appropriate question is not whether, given such infor-
mation, patent examiner would not allow claim, but whether such information
would have been important to reasonable examiner in deciding whether to allow
claim), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 903 (1985).
17. Walker Process Equip. Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S.
172, 177 (1965). The relevant market is the area of effective competition. Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 328 (1962). The Brown Shoe Court stated
that "only a further examination of the particular market-its structure, history
and probable future-can provide the appropriate setting for judging the prob-
able anticompetitive effect of the merger." Id. at 322.
18. Conceptual Eng'g Assocs., Inc. v. Aelectronic Bonding, Inc., 714 F. Supp.
1262, 1266 (D.R.I. 1989). Intent must be shown to establish that the conduct in
question is "predatory" or "anti-competitive." Id. at 1268. To monopolize a partic-
ular industry, a party must be conscious of its monopolizing actions. Id. The court
in ConceptualEngineeringfound an abundance of evidence demonstrating the plain-
tiff's intent to monopolize. Specifically, the court noted vicious and misleading
advertising relating to ownership of the product in question. Id. at 1269. In an
attempt to diminish the defendant's reputation, the plaintiffs placed ads in the
defendant's hometown newspaper and also distributed propaganda at various
trade shows. Id. The evidence of intent was so extreme that the court described
plaintiff's tactics as "industrial warfare, with little regard for the rules of the game."
Id.; see also Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 602-03
(1985) (noting agreement of case law and scholars on necessity of intent in suit
under Sherman Act); Handgards, 743 F.2d at 1293 (noting that party alleging anti-
trust violation "can establish the existence of specific intent not only by direct evi-
dence of unlawful design, but by circumstantial evidence of illegal conduct").
19. American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1366-
67 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984); Brunswick Corp. v. Riegel Textile
Corp., 752 F.2d 261, 265 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1018 (1985). Most
patented inventions are economically worthless and those inventions that do make
it to market only confer market power when there is an absence of effectively com-
peting products. USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, 694 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1982)
(citing SCM v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1203 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 1016 (1982)); see also Kevin J. Arquit, Patent Abuse and the Antitrust Laws, 59
AN=rrusr LJ. 739, 740 (1991). ("The proposition that a patent confers market
power is true only when other suppliers cannot offer substitutes for a patented
product in sufficient quantities to prevent the exercise of market power.").
20. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 153 (1951); Conceptual
Eng'g, 714 F. Supp. at 1266. In Lorain, the Supreme Court held that the Lorain
Journal's practice of denying advertising space to any local business who also ad-
vertised over a competing radio station constituted an attempt to monopolize. Lo-
rain, 342 U.S. at 147-48. The Court found that the Lorain Journal's sole mission
was to completely destroy and eliminate the competing radio station. Id. at 150.
Because the Journal was "an indispensable medium of advertising" for the Lorain
community, many local advertisers discontinued their use of radio advertising. Id.
at 152-53. As a result, the loss of local revenue dollars threatened the survival of
5
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plaintiff in an antitrust action must establish that the inequitable
conduct of the defendant led to the type of injury that antitrust laws
were designed to prevent.21 For example, if the defendant's inequi-
table conduct merely resulted in the wrong individual being as-
signed inventorship, the consumer would not have suffered an
injury and the antitrust laws would not be applicable.22
the radio station. Id. at 153. The Court held that although the radio station had
not folded as of the time of the suit, it was dangerously probable that closure
would occur. Id. In Conceptual Engineering, the district court determined that Con-
ceptual Engineering's "attempt to monopolize the market had a dangerous
probability of success." Conceptual Eng'g, 714 F. Supp. at 1270. The court relied on
the fact that Conceptual Engineering was the sole producer of the goods in ques-
tion for the years involved, thus dominating the industry. Id.
21. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489, cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1090 (1977). Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat involved an antitrust
action brought by several bowling centers against one of the largest manufacturers
of bowling equipment in the United States. Id. at 479. Petitioner Brunswick, be-
gan acquiring numerous defaulting bowling centers in the United States. Id. at
479-80. In total, Brunswick acquired and continued operating 168 bowling cen-
ters. Id. at 480. Respondents were three regional centers that claimed injury from
"the loss of income that would have accrued had the acquired centers gone bank-
rupt." Id. at 487. Thus, the alleged damages were the profits respondents would
have earned had the defaulting competing centers never been acquired. Id. at
489. The Court found that this result would have been the same if the acquired
centers had either refinanced or been acquired by a smaller company. Id. at 487.
The Court held that the antitrust laws were not designed to prevent this type of
injury. Id. at 487-88; see also Dairy Foods Inc. v. Dairy Maid Prods. Coop., 297 F.2d
805, 808-09 (7th Cir. 1961) (holding that company's actions that violate competi-
tor's "right to engage in business free from conspiratorial compulsion" constitutes
the type of injury antitrust laws are designed to prevent). Nevertheless, an anti-
trust claimant who is a defendant in an infringement action may be able to recover
attorney's fees and other litigation expenses even if they cannot establish other
injury. For example, in Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Cincinnati Milacron Inc., the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held:
Milacron did not prove direct market place damages resulting from
K&T's anticompetitive acts. However, the district court found that Mi-
lacron was placed in the position of being required to choose from
among three alternatives-cease competing with K&T, take a license
from K&T, or defend an infringement action. Milacron chose to defend
the action brought by K&T, and in the course of these proceedings it
established the existence of fraud to the satisfaction of the district court.
This in itself met the requirement that there be a causal connection be-
tween the infringement suit and the antitrust activities and led the district
court to conclude, as a matter of law, that Milacron was entitled to re-
cover the costs and expenses of defending the infringement suit as dam-
ages for the antitrust violations.
562 F.2d 365, 374 (6th Cir. 1977).
22. Brunswick Corp. v. Riegel Textile Corp., 752 F.2d 261, 265-66 (7th Cir.
1984). In this case, Brunswick alleged that it was the true inventor of a particular
process used to make "antistatic yarn." Id. at 264. Brunswick contended that it had
revealed the invention to Riegel who, unlike Brunswick, would be able to utilize
the process. Riegel allegedly promised not to disclose the process. Id. Subse-
quently, both Brunswick and Riegel applied for a patent and Riegel was awarded a
patent on the process. Id. Brunswick sued Riegel, claiming that Riegel's procure-
1214
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In some instances, the fraudulent procurement of a patent may
result in the government filing suit under section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) Act. This provision is broader in scope
than either the Sherman Act or the Clayton Act, prohibiting
"[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce." s2
In order to prevail under section 5, the Federal Trade Commission
must establish that a fraudulently obtained patent had an adverse
effect on competition.24 Unlike the Clayton Act, the FTC Act does
not have a provision allowing the trebling of damages, or a provi-
sion allowing private individuals to file an action.25 Nevertheless,
courts have used the FTC Act to affirm Commission orders forcing
patent holders to license inventions at fixed, and relatively low, roy-
ment of the patent by fraud constituted a violation of the Sherman Act. The Sev-
enth Circuit disagreed, stating:
[F]or a fraud to be material in an antitrust sense the plaintiff must show
that but for the fraud no patent would have been issued to anyone. If a
patent would have been issued to someone, the fraud could but have di-
verted market power from one who had the right to possess and exploit it
to someone else.
... The theft of a perfectly valid patent, in contrast, creates no monopoly
power; it merely shifts a lawful monopoly into different hands. This has
no antitrust significance, although it hurts the lawful owner of the mo-
nopoly power.
Id. at 265-66.
23. Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 719 (1914) (current
version at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1994)). For a short comparison of the main provi-
sions of the Sherman Act, Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act, see
A.D. NEALE & G.D. GODNER, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERCA: A STUDY OF COMPETITION ENFORCED BY LAW 3-5 (1980).
24. American Cyanamid Co. v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757, 768 (6th Cir. 1966). In
American Cyanamid, the Sixth Circuit quoted the Federal Trade Commission's or-
der in the case:
We are not holding that every misrepresentation of fact or withholding of
material information before the Patent Office necessarily constitutes per
se an unfair method of competition under the Federal Trade Commission
Act. Some patents may be commercially worthless or have no adverse
effects on competition. The facts of this case, however, are that a paten-
tee has asserted monopoly rights under a patent so acquired and, as a
consequence thereof, has restrained competition in the manufacture and
sale of an important antibiotic; in at least one year the annual sales of
tetracycline exceeded $100,000,000. The record further discloses the nu-
merous drug houses have endeavored to enter the tetracycline market.
All have been refused with the exception of respondents Cyanamid, Bris-
tol, Squibb and Upjohn.
Id. at 768.
25. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1994) (stating that "any person injured ...
shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained") with 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1994)
(indicating that Commission's responsibility is to ensure fair competition and to
file any complaints alleging unfair trade practices).
1994] 1215
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A particularly good example of patent abuse in the pharmaceu-
tical industry is provided by Charles Pfizer & Co. v. Federal Trade Com-
mission,27 a case also involving elements of price fixing and cartel
behavior. In October 1952, Pfizer filed a patent application on the
antibiotic tetracycline.28 In March of the following year, American
Cyanamid filed an application on the same molecule and an inter-
ference proceeding was initiated by the Patent Office to resolve the
question of priority.2 9 Pfizer and American Cyanamid subsequently
entered into a cross-licensing agreement ensuring that both compa-
nies would benefit if the patent on tetracycline was awarded to
either.30 American Cyanamid then withdrew its claim to priority
and, accordingly, the interference proceeding was terminated in
February 1954.31
One month later, Bristol-Myers filed an application for a pat-
ent whereby it claimed priority to tetracycline.32 As a result, the
Patent Office initiated a second interference action.33 During the
course of this proceeding, both American Cyanamid and Pfizer in-
tentionally misrepresented the results of experiments performed to
determine whether tetracycline was produced by a previously pat-
26. For an example of a court using the FTC Act in such a fashion, see
Charles Pfizer & Co. v. FTC, 401 F.2d 574 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 920
(1969). For further discussion of Pfizer, see infra notes 27-38 and accompanying
text.
27. 401 F.2d 574 (6th Cir. 1968). This case should be read in conjunction
with the Sixth Circuit's earlier decision on the same case, American Cyanamid v.
FTC, 363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1966).
28. Pfizer, 401 F.2d at 578.
29. Id. at 578-79. An interference proceeding is provided for by 35 U.S.C.
§ 135 (1988): Under § 135(a):
(a) Whenever an application is made for a patent which, in the opinion
of the Commissioner, would interfere with any pending application, or
with any unexpired patent, an interference may be declared and the
Commissioner shall give notice of such declaration to the applicants, or
applicant and patentee, as the case may be. The Board of Patent Appeals
and Interference shall determine questions of priority of invention and
may determine questions of patentability.
Id.
30. Pfizer, 401 F.2d at 579. The agreement provided that American Cyanamid
and Pfizer would decide between themselves who had priority in the patent. Ameri-
can Cyanamid, 363 F.2d at 761. Once priority was settled, the losing party would
help the winner secure the patent. Id. Upon receipt of the patent, the patentee
would license use of the patent to the other company, and both companies would
share any relevant information regarding the production of tetracycline. Id.
31. Pfizer, 401 F.2d at 579.
32. Id.
33. Id.
1216 [Vol. 39: p. 1209
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ented process.34 As a direct result of these falsifications, the patent
examiner dropped his contention that the invention in question
was not patentable.3 5
The Federal Trade Commission held hearings and found that
the actions by American Cyanamid and Pfizer constituted a viola-
tion of section 5 of the FTC Act.36 On appeal, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit summarized the findings of
the Federal Trade Commission as follows:
The Commission found that Pfizer made deliberately false
and misleading statements to, and withheld material infor-
mation from, the Patent Office in securing its tetracycline
patent; that this conduct amounted to 'unclean hands,'
'inequitableness' and 'bad faith' vis a vis the Patent Office;
that Pfizer asserted monopoly rights under its patent in
order to prevent competition in the tetracycline market;
and that the effects of Pfizer's acts and conduct before the
Patent Office have been to ... create a monopoly in the
... sale of tetracycline .... 37
The circuit court affirmed the Commission's decision that Pfizer
and American Cyanamid had violated section 5 of the FTC Act and,
among other remedies, ordered Pfizer to license its patent on tetra-
cycline to any domestic applicant at a royalty of 2.5%.38
B. Tying Arrangements
A tying arrangement occurs whenever a seller conditions the
34. Id. at 580-81. There were also indications that, like American Cyanamid,
other competitors of Pfizer may have used knowledge concerning the fraud to
force their way into the monopoly. Bristol-Myers relinquished its claim to priority
when Pfizer granted it a license to manufacture and sell tetracycline. Similar
licenses were granted to Squibb and Upjohn. American Cyanamid, 363 F.2d at 766.
All of the licensees sold tetracycline at the same price. Id. The FTC filed suit
alleging that each of the companies involved had engaged in price fixing and mo-
nopolization in violation of § 5 of the FTC Act. Id. at 762. Charges that Squibb,
Upjohn and Bristol-Myers had participated in deliberately concealing information
from the Patent Office were dismissed, although each was found guilty of price
fixing. Id.
35. Pfizer, 401 F.2d at 581-83.
36. Id. at 586.
37. American Cyanamid, 363 F.2d at 762. The Commission also found that
American Cyanamid had suppressed certain relevant information. Id. The Com-
mission held that such suppression when "combined with the cross-licensing agree-
ment between Pfizer and Cyanamid ... constituted an illegal attempt to share a
monopoly with Pfizer and amounted to a combination in restraint of trade." Id.
38. Pfizer, 401 F.2d at 586 (affirming and providing extracts from Commis-
sion's final decision).
1994] 1217
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sale of one product upon the purchase of a second, distinct prod-
uct.5 9 Historically, such arrangements have taken the form of a pat-
entee demanding that purchasers of his or her invention (the tying
product) also agree to purchase nonpatented goods (the tied prod-
ucts). For example, the maker of a patented printing machine may
demand that purchasers buy the paper and ink for the machine
exclusively from him or her.4
0
Patent law has long condemned tying arrangements as at-
tempts to unlawfully extend patent monopolies beyond the scope
of a claimed invention.4' As a result, patentees may not tie the
39. E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, POLICY AND
PROCEDURE 433-34 (1989). Tying arrangements are typically governed by the fol-
lowing three statutes: the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act and the FTC Act. Id. at
434. According to Professors Sullivan and Hovenkamp, tying arrangements can be
broken down into two different types, "fixed proportion and variable proportion."
Id. at 436. A "fixed proportion" tie-in is basically an exchange of products one-for-
one, or whatever proportion the seller has indicated. Id. The tying arrangement
more applicable to this Article is the "variable proportion" arrangement. "In a
variable proportion arrangement purchasers or lessees of the tying product use
varying amounts of some tied product." Id. Tying arrangements are most often
used to allow the owner of the tying product (and perhaps the tied product) "to
price discriminate-that is to obtain a higher rate of profit from higher intensity
users" of the tying products. Id.
40. See, e.g., Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912), overruled by Motion
Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). In Henry, A.B.
Dick Company sold one of their patented mimeograph machines to a customer.
Id. at 11. The mimeograph contained a license restriction requiring that the
machine could "be used only with the stencil paper, ink and other supplies made
by A.B. Dick Company." Id. The defendant, Henry, was charged with selling the
customer a can of ink not made by A.B. Dick with full knowledge of the existing
license restriction. Id. at 11-12. Henry was found guilty of contributory infringe-
ment of A.B. Dick Company's patent. Id. at 48-49. According to the Supreme
Court, "[clontributory infringement has been well defined as the intentional aid-
ing of one person by another in the unlawful making or selling or using of the
patented invention." Id. at 34 (citations omitted). A significant fact in the Court's
decision was that Henry knew of the restriction on the license. Id. at 49. The
Court held that even though A.B. Dick Company did not maintain a patent on ink,
stencil and paper, use of non-A.B. Dick material for the particular mimeograph
constituted infringement. Id. at 31. According to the Henry Court, infringement
occurs because "competition in the sale of such articles, for use with the [pat-
ented] machine, w[ould] be affected." Id. at 31-32.
Henry was subsequently overruled. See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal
Film Mfg., 243 U.S. 502, 517 (1944) ("It is obvious that the conclusions arrived at
in this opinion are such that the decision in Henry... must be regarded as over-
ruled."). For further discussion of the Motion Picture holding, see infra note 41 and
accompanying text.
41. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
Motion Picture involved a patent for a piece of equipment used in a movie projec-
tion machine. Id. at 505. Motion Picture Patents Company owned the patent and
granted a license to one of the defendants in the case. Id. at 506. The license
contained a restriction limiting the machine's use to certain films not under any
patent, nor patented with the projector itself. Id. The defendants used films other
than those of Motion Picture when operating the projector. Id. Consequently,
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purchase of their invention to the purchase of other products un-
less the tied products are both essential and unique to the inven-
tion.42 Restrictions on the purchase of unpatented products such
as staple goods are unenforceable. 43
The Supreme Court recently considered the antitrust implica-
tions of tying arrangements in Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v.
Hyde.44 According to the majority and Justice O'Connor's concur-
rence, tying arrangements are per se illegal if four elements can be
established: (1) the tying and tied products are separate; (2) the
seller has market power or market power is probable in the tying
product; (3) the seller is using his market power to force the buyer
to purchase the tied product; and (4) the arrangement affects a
substantial amount of commerce in the tied product by restraining
competition.45 Each of these elements of per se illegality is consid-
Motion Picture filed an infringement suit against the defendants for violation of
the restriction. The Court stated that the scope of the monopoly granted to an
inventor via a patent "must be limited to the invention described in the claims of
his [or her] patent." Id. at 511. It further determined that materials used with the
machine "are not part of the patented machine or of the combination which pro-
duces the patented result." Id. at 512. The Court also focused on the language of
the version of the Clayton Act existing at the time, stating that it was unlawful for a
company to license patented or unpatented machinery conditioned upon the non-
use of competitors' machinery or equipment. Id. (citation omitted). The Court
condemned tying arrangements, stating that "[a] restriction which would give to
the plaintiff such a potential power of evil over an industry ... is plainly void,
because wholly [outside] the scope and purpose of our patent laws and.., gravely
injurious to th[e] public interest." Id. at 519; see also Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Conti-
nent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 664-65 (1944) (emphasizing consistency of court deci-
sions after Motion Picture in prohibiting patent owners from requiring licensees of
patented machines to use specified non-patented products).
42. This is often referred to as the "patent misuse" doctrine. Dawson Chem.
Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 179-80 (1980). The doctrine has. under-
gone considerable alterations over the years and its present scope and viability are
open to debate. See L. Peter Farkas, Can a Patent Still Be Misused ?, 59 ANTrrRusT L.J.
677 (1991) (arguing for elimination or revision of patent misuse doctrine); Robert
J. Hoerner, Patent Misuse: Portents for the 1990s, 59 ANTITRUST LJ. 687 (1991) (as-
serting need for modification of patent misuse doctrine).
43. See Mercoid, 320 U.S. at 664 (prohibiting restriction on non-patented
goods); Motion Picture, 243 U.S. at 512 (finding that grant of patent "has nothing to
do with the materials with which or on which the machine operates").
44. 466 U.S. 2 (1984). In Jefferson Parish, the Supreme Court considered an
agreement under which all of the patients undergoing surgery at a particular hos-
pital were required to purchase anesthesiological services from a specified medical
group. Id. at 5. An anesthesiologist, Hyde, sought a declaratory judgment that the
agreement was illegal. Id.
45. Id. at 15-18, 21; id. at 38-39 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In concurrence,
Justice O'Connor argued that a rule of reason approach, rather than a per se ille-
gality approach, made more sense:
The "per se" doctrine in tying cases has thus always required an elab-
orate inquiry into the economic effects of the tying arrangement. As a
result, tying doctrine incurs the costs of a rule-of-reason approach with-
1994] 1219
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ered below.
First, a "coherent economic basis for treating the tying and tied
products as distinct" must be established.46 The Court declared
that consumer demand will determine whether such a basis exists.47
Accordingly, the Court stated: "[W] hether one or two products are
involved turns not on the functional relation between them, but
rather on the character of the demand for the two items .... [A]
tying arrangement cannot exist unless two separate product mar-
kets have been linked."48
The second element that must be established is that the seller
has market power with respect to the tying product.49 The Court in
Jefferson Parish reaffirmed its earlier position that patented products
carry with them a presumption of market power.50 Under this pre-
out achieving its benefits: the doctrine calls for the extensive and time-
consuming economic analysis characteristic of the rule of reason, but
then may be interpreted to prohibit arrangements that economic analysis
would show to be beneficial.
Id. at 34 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). UnderJefferson Parish, a
rule of reason analysis should be used only if a plaintiff fails to establish the ele-
ments necessary for a per se conviction. SeeJ. Dianne Brinson, Proof of Economic
Power in a Sherman Act Tying Arrangement Case: Should Economic Power be Presumed
When the Tying Product is Patented or Copyrighted?, 48 LA. L. REv. 29, 31 n.ll (1987)
("[U]nder a 'rule of reason' approach, [the factfinder] must consider all factors
and circumstances which might condemn or justify the defendant's behavior.").
46. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 39 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Brinson,
supra note 45, at 19-20 & nn. 31-32.
47. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 21-22. The Court found that the arrangement
constituted "the purchase of two distinguishable products." Id. at 24. With respect
to the hospital having market power in the provision of medical services, the Court
held that the preference of citizens to go to this particular hospital because it was
closest did not signify market power. Id. at 26. Thus, the Court found the hospi-
tal's market power "far from overwhelming." Id. Furthermore, the Court found
"no evidence that the hospital 'forced' any ... services on unwilling patients." Id.
at 28. Finally, the Court found the arrangement caused no significant restraint on
competition for anesthesiological services in the area. Id. at 29-30.
48. Id. at 19-21 (citations omitted). The Court in Jefferson Parish stated: "[I]n
this case no tying arrangement can exist unless there is a sufficient demand for the
purchase of anesthesiological services separate from hospital services to identify a
distinct product market in which it is efficient to offer anesthesiological services
separately from hospital services." Id. at 21-22.
49. Id. at 26.
50. Id. at 16. "[I]f the Government has granted the seller a patent of similar
monopoly over a product, it is fair to presume that the inability to buy the product
elsewhere gives the seller market power." Id. Although the Jefferson Parish case did
not involve a patented product, the Court was reaffirming their position set forth
in United States v. Loew's, 371 U.S. 38 (1962). Loew's involved goods protected by
a copyright. For purposes of antitrust analysis, patents and copyrights may be con-
sidered essentially the same and Loew's represents the last time that the Supreme
Court reviewed such products in the context of tying. Brinson, supra note 45, at 33
& n.16. Specifically, in Loew's six motion picture film distributors were charged
with violating the Sherman Act by conditioning the sale of copyrighted feature
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sumption, the amount of consumer demand for a patented product
is ignored, and, at a minimum, the burden of producing evidence
that a product is subject to significant competition shifts to the
defendant. 51
The third element set forth in Jefferson Parish as necessary for a
finding of per se illegality is the probability of "forcing" on the part
of the seller.52 The "essential characteristic of an invalid tying ar-
rangement lies in the seller's exploitation of its control over the
films with the purchase of lower quality, less desired films. Id. at 40. The defend-
ants would not license an individual feature film to a television station nor would
they allow the station to select the lower quality films attached to the feature's sale.
The Loew's Court reiterated its antipathy to "use of the . . .patent monopoly to
extend the patentee's economic control to unpatented products." Id. at 46. Bas-
ing its decision on both the nature and effect of the tying arrangement in ques-
tion, the Court held that the arrangement restricted the free flow of trade in the
industry and thus was illegal. Id. at 49-50. When the effect of an arrangement is to
restrain free competition, "the antitrust laws do not permit a compounding of the
statutorily conferred monopoly." Id.
The use of patents as a proxy for market power has been the subject of consid-
erable criticism. In Jefferson Parish, Justice O'Connor argued that:
A common misconception has been that a patent or copyright... suffices
to demonstrate market power.... [I]t is also possible that a seller in
these situations will have no market power: for example, a patent holder
has no market power in any relevant sense if there are close substitutes
for the patented product.
Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 37 n.7 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Brinson, supra
note 45, at 45-68 (criticizing presumption of market power when product is pat-
ented). The critical factor is not that a patented product is unique. Brinson, supra
note 45, at 65. Absent an error on the part of the Patent Office, all patented
products are unique. The critical factor is that consumers regard the unique at-
tributes of the product as desirable enough to justify a higher price. Id. at 53-58,
66. Exclusionary rights granted by a patent "do not enable the patentee .. .to
prevent the development and sale of substitutes for the tying product," and there-
fore a presumption of economic power grounded on these rights is illusory. Id. at
84-85.
51. See Brinson, supra note 45, at 52 (providing example of burden shifting to
defendant). The Supreme Court has never indicated whether the presumption of
market power is conclusive or rebuttable. Id. at 49. If rebuttable, the Court has
not stated whether the presumption shifts the burden of persuasion to the defend-
ant or merely the burden of production. Id. Lower courts have generally regarded
the presumption as rebuttable. See, e.g., Digidyne Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 734
F.2d 1336, 1344 (9th Cir. 1984) (stating that burden of rebutting presumption of
market power is on party accused of tying), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 908 (1985). Some
jurisdictions have adopted Justice O'Connor's view that plaintiffs are not entitled
to a presumption of market power solely because a defendant's product is pat-
ented. See, e.g., Klo-zik Co. v. General Motors Corp., 677 F. Supp. 499, 505 (E.D.
Tex. 1987) (remarking that although patent typically creates presumption of mar-
ket power, mere existence of patent does not demonstrate effect on interchangea-
bility of product in market, which is better indication of market power); Nobel
Scientific Indus. v. Beckman Instruments Inc., 670 F. Supp. 1313, 1329 (D. Md.
1986) (citing Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Jefferson Parish and stating that
true indicator of market power is lack of "readily available substitutes," not exist-
ence of patent), aff'd, 831 F.2d 537 (1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1226 (1988).
52. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 15-16.
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tying product to force the buyer into the purchase of a tied product
that the buyer either did not want at all or might have preferred to
purchase elsewhere on different terms."5 3 A seller may not use the
market power of one product to coerce buyers into paying higher
prices for a tied product.54 Thus, forcing may be thought of as an
abuse of market power.
The final element that must be established for a tying arrange-
ment to be per se illegal is that the arrangement must have affected
a substantial amount of commerce.55 The word "substantial" in this
context may be taken as synonymous with "significant." "[T]he
controlling consideration is simply whether a total amount of busi-
ness, substantial enough in terms of dollar-volume so as not to be
merely de minimis, is foreclosed to competitors by the tie .... ,,56
The overall effect of antitrust law, as applied in Jefferson Parish,
is to deter pharmaceutical manufacturers from combining a propri-
etary drug with any product that may be considered distinct.5 7 An
53. Id. at 12.
54. Id. at 12-14 & n.19.
55. Id. at 16.
56. Fortner Enters. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 501 (1969).
According to the Fortner Court, the per se illegality of a tying arrangement is estab-
lished if the plaintiff can demonstrate that: 1) "a party has sufficient economic
power with respect to the tying product to appreciably restrain free competition in
the market for the tied product," and 2) "a 'not insubstantial' amount of interstate
commerce is affected." Id. at 499.
57. See Mark A. Hurwitz, Note, Bundling Patented Drugs and Medical Services: An
Antitrust Analysis, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1188, 1197-206 (applying tying arrangement
analysis to antipsychotic drug, Clozaril, and unassociated blood monitoring sys-
tem). The wisdom of antitrust tying doctrine has been the subject of considerable
debate. See, e.g., id. at 1206-20 (arguing for rule of reason analysis in certain tying
arrangements). For example, some commentators have argued that tying arrange-
ments do not hurt consumers and therefore, should not be subject to antitrust law.
See, e.g., BoRK, supra note 8, at 365-81 (arguing that tying arrangements can benefit
consumers through economics of scale, technological interdependence and in-
creased market efficiency). The essence of this argument is that it is simply not
possible for a seller to extend the monopoly power of a product by tying the sale of
that product to a second product. Id. at 365-66. As one commentator summarized
this argument:
Even in those circumstances when a patent does convey some market
power, licensing restrictions do not extend the patent monopoly.., in
any economically meaningful sense beyond the market for the patented
product. This notion is basically a recognition that there is only a single
monopoly price for any given product, and you can either sell that prod-
uct alone or you can combine it with as many complements as you want,
but you are only going to be able to earn that one monopoly profit. The
notion that a patentee may somehow increase its monopoly profits by
using the patent as a lever into another market is simply wrong as an
economic matter.
Charles F. Rule, Patent-Antitrust Policy: Looking Back and Ahead, 59 ANTrrRUsT LJ.
729, 731 (1991) (footnote omitted); cf. Keith K. Wollenberg, An Economic Analysis
1222 [Vol. 39: p. 1209
14
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 5 [1994], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol39/iss5/2
1994] ANTITRUST LAW AND PATENT MISCONDUCT 1223
example of an improper tying arrangement involving pharmaceuti-
cals is provided by the anti-schizophrenic drug Clozaril. 58
Clinical studies in both the United States and in Europe indi-
cate that Clozaril is superior to all other drugs presently available
for the treatment of schizophrenia. 59 Moreover, the drug is often
effective in patients whose disease has proven resistant to all other
treatments. 60 Unfortunately, Clozaril also causes agranulocytosis, a
potentially fatal blood disorder, in a small percentage of the pa-
tients taking the drug.61 The risk of death can be largely elimi-
nated, but only by identifying patients experiencing agranulocytosis
and discontinuing the administration of Clozaril to those patients.62
In October 1989, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
approved Clozaril for the treatment of severely ill schizophrenic pa-
tients who fail to respond to standard therapy.63 Sandoz
of Tie-In Sales: Re-examining the Leverage Theory, 39 STAN. L. REv. 737 (1987) (argu-
ing that tying arrangements may allow manufacturers to use monopoly power in
one product to attain monopoly power in another product, but end results benefit
consumers and market). Although Wollenberg agrees with earlier commentators
that tying arrangements can benefit social welfare and should not be per se illegal,
he does not agree that is impossible for a monopolist to use the monopoly power
in one product as leverage into another product market. Wollenberg, supra, at
744-60. Wollenberg believes that, under the proper economic conditions, a mo-
nopolist can exert monopoly power in a second market, but only at the price con-
sumers are willing to pay for the "bundle" of goods. Id. at 744-50. Wollenberg
argues that this situation benefits both the seller through increased profits, and
the consumer through increased social welfare. Id. at 749.
58. For a recent review of Clozaril in the context of antitrust law, see Hurwitz,
supra note 57.
59. See Stephen R. Marder & Theodore Van Putten, Who Should Receive
Clozapine?, 45 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 865, 865-66 (1988) (reviewing early
clinical studies of Clozaril).
60. Id. at 865. The clinical studies with Clozaril demonstrated its effectiveness
in severely ill patients who had not responded to the antipsychotic medications
Thorazine, Prolixin and Haldol. Id. at 856-66. When given Clozaril, these patients
demonstrated fewer symptoms of schizophrenia, and did not experience the dis-
turbing side effects associated with the other antipsychotic medications.
61. Id. at 865. Agranulocytosis is a condition associated with a potentially fatal
low level of white blood cells. Hurwitz, supra note 57, at 1190. The incidence rate
of agranulocytosis in patients taking Clozaril is between one and two percent. Carl
Salzman, Mandatory Monitoring for Side Effects, 323 NEw ENG. J. MED. 827, 827
(1990).
62. Salzman, supra note 61, at 827. Dr. Salzman reports that a person's white
blood cell count returns to normal shortly after Clozaril is discontinued. If the
drug is re-administered, however, the condition is likely to return. Id.
63. Ron Winslow, Wonder Drug: Sandoz Corp. 's Clozaril Treats Schizophrenia But
Can Kill Patients and Blood Tests to Prevent the Lethal Side Effects are Costly, Controversial,
WALL ST.J., May 14, 1990, at Al; see also Stuart L. Nightingale, Approval of Clozapine
for Refractory Schizophrenia 263 JAMA 202, 202 (1990) (reporting FDA approval).
Recognizing the risk of agranulocytosis associated with the use of Clozaril, the FDA
required instructions that Clozaril should be used only with severely ill patients
who have not responded to other antipsychotic medications. Nightingale, supra, at
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Pharmaceuticals was granted marketing rights under the Drug
Price Competition and Patent Restoration Act of 1984 and it distrib-
uted the drug exclusively through Caremark Pharmacies. 64
Sandoz demanded that patients receiving the drug adhere to a
compulsory blood monitoring program designed to detect agranu-
locytosis. 65 Each week, patients were required to go to a Caremark
pharmacy and have blood drawn for testing.66 If a patient com-
plied and test results were negative, he or she would receive a sup-
ply of Clozaril sufficient for one more week.67
Although this program was effective at reducing the risk of
agranulocytosis, it was also expensive. The cost of treating a patient
using the combined drug and drug monitoring system, approxi-
mately $9,000 per year, could not be afforded by the public agen-
cies providing care to most of the mentally ill.68 As a result, Clozaril
was available only to a small fraction of the people who could po-
tentially benefit from its administration. 69 Twenty-nine states filed
antitrust actions against Sandoz claiming that it had illegally tied
the sale of a drug to a medical service. 70 In response to this pres-
sure, Sandoz announced that, beginning in April 1991, it would al-
low health care providers to perform their own independent
monitoring.71
202. In addition, the FDA strongly recommended that before Clozaril treatment is
initiated, the treating facility make at least two separate attempts to treat the pa-
dent with other medications. Id.
64. Hurwitz, supra note 57, at 1189 & n.4. Sandoz granted Caremark, a home
health care division of Baxter International, Inc., an exclusive contract to both sell
Clozaril and to carry out patient monitoring. Id. at 1190.
65. Id. at 1189-90.
66. Id. at 1190. The Caremark employees did not analyze the blood samples.
Instead, the samples were sent to a national clinical laboratory that analyzed the
blood and sent the results to the patient's physician. Id.
67. Id.
68. Winslow, supra note 63, at Al. In 1990, it was estimated that the total cost
of providing Clozaril to everyone who might benefit would be $2 billion. Id.
States' estimates of the yearly cost of Clozaril treatment varied. For example, in
1990, New York budgeted $2 million, whereas Texas predicted it would spend $100
million and California predicted spending $300 million. Id. Oklahoma estimated
that the cost of providing patients with Clozaril and the associated monitoring
would exceed the state's entire mental health budget. Id.
69. Id. In 1990, only 4000 patients received Clozaril. Id. At the time, it was
estimated that 200,000 people might benefit from the drug. Id.
70. Hurwitz, supra note 57, at 1188.
71. Paul Cotton, Schizophrenia Therapy Controversy Continues, 265 JAMA 1503,
1503, 1507 (1991) [hereinafter Cotton, Controversy Continues]. In February 1991,
Sandoz indicated that it would allow health care providers to conduct the blood
monitoring procedure without using Caremark Pharmacies, but it did not agree to
implement this plan before April 1991. Id. Sandoz agreed, however, to allow pri-
vate blood monitoring only if the health care provider's monitoring system met
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The response of Sandoz is not surprising. Under the standards
set forth in Jefferson Parish, a verdict for the plaintiffs was very prob-
able. 72 In 1990, Clozaril was the only drug on the market tied to a
mandatory medical service despite the presence of drugs with simi-
larly severe side effects. 73 Moreover, Clozaril had been marketed in
Europe for over fifteen years using voluntary monitoring.74 In addi-
tion, it was clear from the publicity surrounding the drug, and from
the numerous lawsuits filed against Sandoz, that there was con-
sumer demand for separate products and that purchasers were be-
ing forced to pay for a monitoring program that they did not
want.7 5 Thus, the first element necessary for a per se illegal tying
arrangement, a basis for treating tying and tied products as distinct,
and the third element, forcing, were clearly present.7 6
The second element, market power in the tying product, was
also apparent. 77 The relevant market for Clozaril was defined by its
FDA license as severely ill patients failing to respond to standard
therapy for schizophrenia. 78 Clozaril was the only drug occupying
this market and was sold at an unusually high price.79 The combi-
nation of functional distinctiveness and an abnormally raised price,
constitutes market power in its most obvious form.
Finally, per se illegality requires that the tying arrangement af-
Sandoz's approval. Id. at 1503. Experts believed that "unbundling" the drug and
the monitoring system would lower the cost of Clozaril from $9000 a year to $4160
a year, which was still three times the price of Clozaril in Europe. Id. at 1507.
Throughout the debate over Clozaril and the blood monitoring system, Sandoz
claimed that it was only protecting itself from liability and had not realized a profit
on its development of Clozaril. Industry analysts, however, disputed this claim.
Paul Cotton, Public Pressure Ends 'Bundled' Drug rogram. But How Much Cost Will
Drop Remains Unclear, 265 JAMA 837, 837-38 (1991) [hereinafter Cotton, Pressure
Ends Program].
72. For a complete discussion of the standards set forth in Jefferson Parish, see
supra notes 44-56 and accompanying text.
73. Hurwitz, supra note 57, at 1189.
74. Id. at 1190. In Europe, the price of Clozaril without the monitoring sys-
tem was only $1000-$1500 a year, compared to $9000 a year in the United States.
Id.
75. See id. at 1189-96 (discussing legal challenges to Clozaril Patient Manage-
ment System).
76. For a thorough discussion of the first and third elements of a per se illegal
tying arrangement, see supra notes 46-48, 52-54 and accompanying text.
77. For a discussion of the second element of a per se illegal tying arrange-
ment, see supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
78. Nightingale, supra note 63, at 202. For a review of the clinical protocols
required before Clozaril can be administered, see supra note 63.
79. See Winslow, supra note 63, at Al (reporting background information on
Clozaril controversy). For a discussion of the availability and price of Clozaril, see
supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
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fect a "not insubstantial" amount of commerce.80 The monitoring
service linked to the purchase of Clozaril was estimated to generate
approximately $48,000,000 in revenue annually.8 1 It is difficult to
imagine that a court would find that this does not fulfill the mini-
mal requirement set forth in United States v. Loew's.
8 2
Under a per se approach, Sandoz would have been denied the
opportunity of arguing that sales of their drug and service package
did not have an anticompetitive effect, but that it actually benefit-
ted consumers.83 With its best defense unavailable, and facing the
80. For a discussion of this fourth element in a per se illegal tying arrange-
ment, see supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
81. Hurwitz, supra note 57, at 1202.
82. 371 U.S. 38 (1962). For a discussion of Loew's and its effect on antitrust
law with regard to tying arrangements involving a patented product, see supra note
50.
83. SeeJefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15 (1984) (de-
fining per se condemnation of tying arrangements as "condemnation without in-
quiry into actual market conditions"). The argument that Clozaril and its
associated blood monitoring system actually benefitted consumers was not the sole
defense available to Sandoz. See Lynn H. Pasahow, Recent Developments in Tying Law,
57 ANTrrRusT LJ. 379, 391-93 (1988) (discussing business justification defenses in
tying cases); Hurwitz, supra note 57, at 1204-06 (presenting defenses used by de-
fendants in illegal tying cases). For instance, Sandoz could have argued that tying
Clozaril to the blood monitoring system was necessary to protect consumer good-
will. Hurwitz, supra note 57, at 1204. The basic premise of the goodwill defense is
that consumers purchase the tying product from the manufacturer with the expec-
tation of receiving parts and services of a quality necessary to use the product. In
order to fulfill these expectations the manufacturer packages the tying product
with the tied product. See, e.g., Metrix Warehouse Inc. v. Daimler-Benz Aktien-
gesellschaft, 828 F.2d 1033, 1040-41 (4th Cir. 1987) (discussing goodwill defense),
cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017 (1988). Although a goodwill defense is the one most
frequently offered, it is generally unsuccessful. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 337 U.S. 293, 306 (1949) (stating that "[goodwill defense] fails in the usual
situation because specification of the type and quality of the product to be used in
connection with the tying device is protection enough"); Metrix Warehouse, 828 F.2d
at 1040-41 (rejecting goodwill defense). Alternatively, Sandoz could have offered
a business justification defense, if it could demonstrate that the tying arrangement
served a legitimate business purpose and that no less restrictive alternative was
available. See Pasahow, supra, at 391 (discussing business justification defense). On
rare occasions, courts have accepted a business justification defense. See, e.g., Mo-
zart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 833 F.2d 1342, 1348 n.5 (9th Cir. 1987)
("Allowing the defendant to assert a business justification defense is one way of
inquiring into whether the reasons for the relatively historical condemnation of
tie-ins apply to the challenged arrangements."), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 870 (1988);
Dehydrating Process Co. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653, 655 (1st Cir.) ("We
think the principle . . . that a proper business reason may justify what otherwise
might be an unlawful tie-in, is sound."), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 931 (1961); United
States v.Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 554-58 (E.D. Pa. 1960) (ruling that
tying arrangements may be legitimate means of protecting new firm's interests in
technologically complex industry), aff'd, 365 U.S. 567 (1961) (per curiam). In
general, however, business justification defenses have been unsuccessful because
the defendants fail to show that the tying arrangement is the least restrictive way
for them to achieve their objectives. See, e.g., Metrix Warehouse, 828 F.2d at 1040
[Vol. 39: p. 12091226
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likely imposition of treble damages, Sandoz wisely chose to comply
with the requests of its adversaries and eliminate ma ndatory blood
monitoring as a condition for the sale of Clozaril.84
C. Patent Licenses
Nowhere is the tension between patent law and antitrust law
more apparent than in patent license agreements. 85 Congress has
expressly granted patent holders the "right to exclude others from
making, using, or selling" their invention.86 Manufacture, use and
sale constitute separate rights that can be individually licensed by
the inventor.8 7 Thus, a patent holder may grant a licensee the right
("An asserted business justification cannot salvage a tying arrangement that is
otherwise per se unlawful without proof that means less restrictive than the tie-in
were not feasible to achieve the desired protection."). It therefore appears un-
likely that Sandoz would have prevailed using any of these arguments.
84. Cotton, Controversy Continues, supra note 71, at 1503; Cotton, Pressure Ends
Program, supra note 71, at 837.
85. See generally Symposium, Patent-Antitrust: Dead or Alive?, 59 ANTrrRUST L.J.
657 (1991) (presenting a series of articles on patent-antitrust tension). This has
been reflected, in part, by the position of the Antitrust Division of the Department
ofJustice. Rule, supra note 57, at 729 n.1. In the early 1970s, the Antitrust Division
regarded most restrictions contained in patent licenses as per se illegal, including:
tying arrangements; restrictions on resale; grantbacks; exclusive dealing arrange-
ments; exclusive patent grants; package licenses; end-product royalties; restrictions
on the resale of unpatented products made using a patented process; and the set-
ting of prices at which licensees could sell patented products. Id. at 732. The
Antitrust Division has now adopted a more hospitable attitude toward licensing
restrictions, at least in cases where such restrictions fall within the proper scope of
a patent. Id. Using a rule of reason approach, the Division examines all relevant
market conditions and asks whether the net effect of a particular restriction will be
procompetitive or anticompetitive. Id.
86. Patent Process Amendments Act, 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988). The entire text
of § 154 reads:
Every patent shall contain a short tide of the invention and a grant to the
patentee, his heirs or assigns, for the term of seventeen years, subject to
the payment of fees as provided for in this title, of the right to exclude
others from making, using, or selling the invention throughout the
United States and, if the invention is a process, of the right to exclude
others from using or selling throughout the United States, or importing
into the United States, products made by that process,,[sic] referring to
the specification for the particulars thereof. A copy of the specification
and drawings shall be annexed to the patent and be a part thereof.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
87. Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453, 456 (1873). In this case, Adams
obtained the rights to a patent for a newly designed coffin lid. Id. at 454. Before
Adams obtained his interest, however, another party purchased the same patent
interests for a geographical area ten miles in radius around Boston. Id. Burke
purchased one of the coffin lids from the third party, within the ten mile radius of
Boston, but used the lid outside of this designated region. Id. Adams argued that
this use infringed on his exclusive right granted by the patent. Id. The Court
noted that "[tjhe right to manufacture, the right to sell, and the right to use are
each substantive rights, and may be granted or conferred separately by the paten-
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to make and use an invention but withhold the right to sell it."" In
addition, under the Patent Act, patentees may limit the rights they
grant to the "whole or any specified part of the United States."8 9
Such territorial restrictions are usually imposed to limit competi-
tion, and therefore would be per se violations of section 1 of the
Sherman Act were they not part of a patent license.90
In considering the validity of license restrictions, three central
questions must be addressed: (1) Does the restriction fall within
the scope of the invention; (2) Is the restriction a vertical or a hori-
zontal restraint; and (3) Did the patent holder act unilaterally in
imposing the restriction? Each of these questions is considered
separately.
1. Does the Restriction Fall Within the Scope of the Invention?
As long as a patent holder acts unilaterally and imposes a re-
striction only upon his or her own invention, the restriction is im-
mune from antitrust law.91 This is true whether the restriction is in
tee." Id. at 456. In ruling against Adams, the Court reasoned that "when the pat-
entee ... sells a machine or instrument whose sole value is in its use, he receives
the consideration for its use and he parts with the right to restrict that use." Id.
88. Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 544 (1872).
89. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1988). The relevant portion of § 261 reads:
Applications for patent, patents, or any interest therein, shall be assigna-
ble in law by an instrument in writing. The applicant, patentee, or his [or
her] assigns or legal representatives may in like manner grant and convey
an exclusive right under his [or her] application for patent, or patents, to
the whole or any specified part of the United States.
Id.; see also Keller v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659, 661 (1895) (present-
ing early statute granting patent holder right to grant exclusive right under patent
to any specified part of country).
90. See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). Section 1 of the Sherman Act
provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspir-
acy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make
any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared
to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction
thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corpora-
tion, or, if any other person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding
three years, or by both punishments, in the discretion of the court.
Id.; see also United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United
States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 175 U.S. 211, 237-43 (1899) (finding territorial
restraint of trade illegal).
91. Dunlop v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 484 F.2d 407, 417 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 917 (1974). In Dunlop, the relevant issue was whether a patent owner
could grant a license to a foreign company to produce the patented product while
preventing the foreign company from exporting the product to the United States.
Id. The court reasoned that because the patent holder could restrict domestic
licenses without violating antitrust law, it must also be able to restrict foreign
licenses. Id.
1228
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the form of a territorial restraint,92 a restriction on the use for
which a patented product is sold,93 a restraint on the quantity of
patented product produced, 94 or a restraint on price. 95 If the pat-
92. See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1988) (granting patent holder right to assign licenses
restricted to specified geographical areas); see also Bloomer v. McQuewen, 55 U.S.
(14 How.) 539, 549 (1852) ("And when [the patent owner] sells the exclusive privi-
lege of making or vending [the goods] for use in a particular place, the purchaser
buys a portion of the franchise which the patent confers."); United States v. West-
inghouse Elec. Corp., 471 F. Supp. 532, 541-42 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (finding license
agreement granting right to use technology for goods sold anywhere in world, ex-
cept in United States and Canada, to be valid), aff'd, 648 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1981).
93. See General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175, 179-
82 (1938) (upholding license agreement to sell patented amplifiers for limited
use). In General Talking Pictures, American Telephone & Telegraph held a patent
for radio vacuum tube amplifiers. Id. at 179. The American Transformer Com-
pany was granted a non-exclusive license to manufacture and to sell these tubes for
radio reception. Id. at 179-80. The patent holder alleged that Transformer know-
ingly sold amplifier tubes for use in motion picture theaters, violating the license
agreement. Id. at 180. Transformer argued that the patent owner could not re-
strict the use of a patented product after it was sold to an ordinary purchaser. Id.
The Court suggested that this position might be true if Transformer was assigned
the patent, but instead it only possessed restricted license agreement. Id. at 181.
Under a license agreement, "[p]atent owners may grant licenses extending to all
uses or limited to use in a defined field." Id.
94. United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41 (D. Del.
1953), aff'd, 351 U.S. 377 (1956); see also United States v. Parker Rust Proof Co., 61
F. Supp. 805, 812 (E.D. Mich. 1945) (upholding restrictive license agreement). In
Parker, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan summa-
rized the rights of a patent holder in relation to a licensee:
The owner of a patent has a right to fix royalties; to prescribe sales prices;
to limit the quantity of articles or the percentage of the whole output
which the licensee may manufacture, use or sell; to limit the territory in
which the licensee may operate under the patent; to prescribe the pur-
pose or the field for which the licensee can utilize the invention; to deter-
mine the number of licensees and to select at his [or her] discretion
those to whom licenses shall be issued.
Parker, 61 F. Supp. at 812.
95. United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 488-94 (1926). In Gen-
eral Electric, the patent holder issued a license to a manufacturer to sell patented
incandescent electric lights at a price established by the patent holder. Id. at 479.
The government challenged this arrangement as an illegal restraint of trade. Id.
The Court ruled that the license agreement was valid because a patent holder
retains all property interests in the patented product sold by a licensee. Id. at 490.
The Court concluded that the patent holder could restrict the licensee's sale price,
as long as the conditions of sale are normally and reasonably adapted to secure
pecuniary reward for the patent holder. Id. General Electric has never been over-
ruled. See United States v. Huck Mfg. Co., 227 F. Supp. 791, 803 (E.D. Pa. 1964)
(expressly upholding General Electric and discussing supportive authority), aff'd per
curiam, 382 U.S. 197 (1965). It has, however, been limited by subsequent deci-
sions. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 400-02 (1948)
(applying rule of reason approach to prohibit patentee from issuing identical
licenses to all members of industry and using licensees to control price); United
States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 310-12 (1948) (prohibiting patent hold-
ers from cross-licensing with other patent holders to fix price). As presently inter-
preted, General Electric authorizes a patentee to impose price restrictions on a single
exclusive licensee but not upon several licensees. Newburgh Moire Co. v. Superior
21
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ent holder attempts to impose restrictions on activities outside the
scope of his invention, however, immunity is lost.96
Determining the proper scope of a patent requires that it be
analyzed on a claim by claim basis. Nevertheless, some generaliza-
tions can be made. First, any attempt on the part of a patent holder
to restrict competition in an unpatented product is illegal. 97 For
example, an agreement that a licensee sell no product similar to
the patentee's invention is a per se violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act.98
Second, according to the "patent exhaustion doctrine," a pat-
ent holder may not impose restrictions on an invention beyond its
first sale. 99 Thus, a restriction prohibiting purchasers of a patented
product from incorporating it into merchandise they manufacture
violates section 1 of the Sherman Act.100 Although this principle
seems simple, difficulties arise when a patentee sells, not his inven-
tion, but rather the right to manufacture the invention. In United
States v. General Electric Co.,10 the Supreme Court drew a distinction
between a license to manufacture and sell a patented product and a
contract under which the patentee merely conveys a finished prod-
Moire Co., 237 F.2d 283, 291-92 (3rd Cir. 1956). Of the various restrictions that
can be imposed, price restrictions are the most suspect. Id.
96. United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513, 522-27 (S.D.N.Y.
1945). "While it has been held that the owner of a patent may license whom he
will or refuse to license, it is now well settled that a license may not be used to
extend the patent monopoly beyond its terms." Id. at 524 (citations omitted).
97. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969). Ha-
zeltine Research granted a license to Zenith to use all of its domestic radio and
television patents. Id. at 104. As part of the licensing package, Hazeltine required
Zenith to pay royalties on non-patented products as well. Id. at 134. In remanding
the case back to the court of appeals, the Supreme Court noted that "conditioning
the grant of a patent license upon payment of royalties on products which do not
use the teaching of the patent does amount to misuse." Id. at 135. The Court
concluded that "[t]here is nothing in the right granted the patentee to keep
others from using, selling, or manufacturing his invention which empowers him to
insist on payment not only for use but also for producing products which do not
employ his discoveries at all." Id. at 139. Because the lower court made no find-
ings relating to these issues, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the court of
appeals. Id. at 141; cf. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 471 F. Supp. 532,
545-46 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (distinguishing Zenith Radio), aff'd, 648 F.2d 642 (9th Cir.
1981).
98. Cf Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. Tatnall Measuring Sys. Co., 169 F.
Supp. 1, 28-33 (E.D. Pa. 1958) (finding agreement restricting licensee's resale of
patented goods per se illegal), aff'd per curiam, 268 F.2d 395 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 894 (1959). For the language of § 1 of the Sherman Act, see supra note
90.
99. Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 455-57 (1873). For a discussion of the facts
and holding in Adams, see supra note 87.
100. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton, 169 F. Supp. at 28-33.
101. 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
22
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 5 [1994], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol39/iss5/2
ANTITRUST LAW AND PATENT MISCONDUCT
uct along with the right to resell it.102 Products covered under the
former type of license are subject to restriction.103 Those covered
under the latter type are not.'0 4 It therefore appears that a patent
is not exhausted until the product covered by the patent is sold; the
mere sale of rights to the product is not sufficient.105
2. Is the Restriction a Vertical or Horizontal Restraint?
Once a restriction in a patent license is found to fall outside
the scope of the patent, antitrust law operates in the same way as it
would with any restraint. 10 6 Because the parties will always have an
102. Id. at 485-94. In General Electric, the Court reviewed two claims. Id. at
478. In essence, the first claim charged that General Electric supplied its light
bulbs to a vendor under a contract that contained a restriction on the resale price.
Id. at 476. The Court concluded that General Electric did not violate antitrust laws
under this arrangement because it had not sold the patented product to independ-
ent sellers, but rather delivered the product to its own agents for resale. As such,
General Electric could establish the price at which its agents sold the goods. Id. at
484-88. The Court indicated in dicta, however, that General Electric would be
prohibited from establishing the resale price of its goods once it sold them to an
independent seller. Id. at 487-88.
The second claim charged that General Electric violated antitrust law by
granting a license to manufacture and sell its product, but restricting the price at
which the licensee could sell the product. Id. at 488-89. The Court determined
that such a price fixing arrangement was within the rights of a patentee and did
not violate antitrust law. Id. at 489-94. The Court reasoned that, in granting the
license to manufacture and sell the product, the patentee did not forfeit its prop-
erty interests in the product. In contrast, when a patentee contracts to sell the
finished product to an independent seller, the product is outside the scope of the
patentee's monopoly rights. Id. at 489-94.
103. Id. at 496.
104. Id. at 489.
105. See id. at 476-94 (explaining distinction between selling goods and grant-
ing license). The question of whether the manufacture of a product is complete is
not always straightforward. For example, in United States v. Univis Lens Co., a corpo-
ration made and sold unfinished lenses for eyeglasses. 62 U.S. 1085 (1942). These
"blanks" were then finished by the purchaser before resale to consumers. Id. at
244. The Court held that the sale of the blanks exhausted Univis's patent and that
price restraints on the subsequent product constituted a violation of § 1 of the
Sherman Act. Id. at 252-54. In reaching its conclusion, the Court stated:
We think that all the considerations which support these results lead to
the conclusion that where one has sold an uncompleted article which,
because it embodies essential features of his patented invention, is within
the protection of his patent, and has destined the article to be finished by
the purchase in conformity to the patent, he has sold his invention so far
as it is or may be embodied in that particular article. The reward he has
demanded and received is for the article and the invention which it em-
bodies and which his vendee is to practice upon it. He has thus parted
with his right to assert the patent monopoly with respect to it and is no
longer free to control the price at which it may be sold either in its unfin-
ished or finished form.
Id. at 251.
106. See, e.g., Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 665-66
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express agreement, the requirement in section 1 of the Sherman
Act that there be a contract, combination or conspiracy is met.10 7
Whether the agreement will ultimately be found to violate the Act
depends largely upon the relationship between the patent holder
and licensee.' 08
If the patent holder and licensee can be characterized as com-
petitors, then the restraints imposed by the license are "horizon-
tal."' 0 9 Any attempt to fix prices among competitors, by setting
minimum or maximum resale prices or by limiting the supply of a
product, is per se illegal.' 10 Similarly, when the parties share a hori-
(1944) (discussing relationship between patent law and antitrust law). In Mercoid,
the Court wrote:
The patent is a privilege. But it is a privilege which is conditioned by a
public purpose. It results from invention and is limited to the invention
which it defines. When the patentee ties something else to his invention,
he acts only by virtue of his right as the owner of property to make con-
tracts concerning it and not otherwise. He then is subject to all the limi-
tations upon that right which the general law imposes upon such
contracts. The contract is not saved by anything in the patent laws be-
cause it relates to the invention. If it were, the mere act of the patentee
could make the distinctive claim of the patent attach to something which
does not possess the quality of invention. Then the patent would be di-
verted from its statutory purpose and become a ready instrument for eco-
nomic control in domains where the antitrust acts or other laws not the
patent statutes define the public policy.
Id. at 666.
107. For the text of § 1 of the Sherman Act, see supra note 90.
108. For a discussion of these relationships, see infra notes 109-16 and accom-
panying text.
109. SULLIVAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 39, at 155. A horizontal restraint of
trade is defined as "[a] restraint of trade involving businesses at the same level of
operation. [It] is an agreement between competitors to refuse to deal with one or
more persons .... " BLAcK's LAw DICrIONARY 737 (6th ed. 1990). Horizontal re-
straints have included price fixing arrangements, market divisions or allocations,
bid rigging and group boycotts. Suuv & HOVENKAM, supra note 39, at 155.
110. See generaUy SuLIuvAN & HoVENKAMP, supra note 39, at 217-39 (presenting
background material and cases on per se illegal price fixing arrangements). As an
example, in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, the Supreme Court addressed attempts to
limit competition by setting minimum resale prices. 421 U.S. 773 (1975). Specifi-
cally, the Court ruled that a minimum fee schedule for lawyers, circulated by the
state bar association, was subject to scrutiny under § 1 of the Sherman Act. Id. at
786-93. Likewise, in Arizona v. Maricopa City Medical Society, the Court examined
attempts to limit competition by setting maximum resale prices. 457 U.S. 332
(1982). In this case, the Court ruled that maximum fee agreements between the
Maricopa County Medical Society and another medical society were per se unlaw-
ful under § 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Id. at 342-57. The Supreme Court has
also confronted the issue of attempts to limit competition by limiting product sup-
ply. United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). The Court
reviewed agreements between a number of oil companies to control prices by con-
trolling the amount of oil in the market at any time. Id. at 177-200. In reaching its
conclusion, the Court stated that "[u]nder the Sherman Act, a combination
formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging
1232
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zontal relationship, any attempt to reduce competition by agreeing
to divide a market into exclusive territories, or by otherwise allocat-
ing customers, is per se illegal.111
In contrast, "vertical" agreements are those between individu-
als or companies operating at different levels in the market.' 12 For
example, an agreement between a wholesaler and retailer, or a
manufacturer and distributor, would be considered vertical.ls As
with horizontal agreements, attempts by a patent holder in a verti-
cal agreement to control the price at which a licensee resells an
invention are per se illegal."14 Market divisions among vertical par-
ties, however, are analyzed under the rule of reason. 15 Such agree-
or stabilizing the price of a commodity in foreign or interstate commerce is illegal
per se." Id. at 223.
111. See United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (finding territo-
rial division of market illegal per se under § 1 of Sherman Act).
112. SULLIVAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 39, at 349. In general, vertical re-
straints on trade are defined as "[a]nticompetitive agreements between entities
operating at different levels of market structure, such as manufacturers and distrib-
utors." BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 1562 (6th ed. 1990).
113. SULLIVAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 39, at 349.
114. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 409
(1911). In Dr. Miles, the Court reviewed contract agreements between a drug man-
ufacturer and retail drug sellers that required the sale of a manufacturer's prod-
ucts at specified prices. Id. at 399-400. The Court reasoned that these agreements
eliminated all competition and were per se illegal. Id. at 400, 409. A possible
exception to this might occur if a patentee licensed a distributor to sell its inven-
tion on a consignment basis. See United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476,
488 (1926) ("The owner of an article, patented or otherwise, is not violating the
common law or the Anti-trust law, by seeking to dispose of his article directly to the
consumer and fixing the price by which his agents, [through consignment], trans-
fer the title from him directly to such consumer."); cf Simpson v. Union Oil Co.,
377 U.S. 13, 24 (1964) (ruling that price fixing consignment agreements main-
tained by coercion are illegal under antitrust law). For a more complete discus-
sion of General Electric, see supra note 102.
115. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977). In
Continental T.V., the Court reviewed a vertical restraint on trade that allowed Sylva-
nia to control the number of franchises in any given area and to control the loca-
tion of franchise stores allowed to sell Sylvania televisions. Id. at 38-40. The Court
found the restriction to be reasonable and expressly refused to apply a per se rule
to such vertical restraints. Id. at 57-59. Under the rule of reason analysis, the fact
finder must weigh all the circumstances of a given arrangement to determine if it
violates antitrust law. Id. at 49. In describing the rule of reason test, the Court
stated:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is
such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that
question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the busi-
ness to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the
restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or
probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the rea-
son for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be
attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a good intention will
1994] 1233
25
Sanzo: Antitrust Law and Patent Misconduct in the Proprietary Drug Indus
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1994
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
ments will be upheld if they can be shown to have an effect that, on
balance, promotes competition. 116
3. Did the Patent Holder Act Unilaterally in Imposing the Restriction?
At times, it may be in the patent holder's interest to limit com-
petition among its licensees. For example, a number of companies
with products competing in the same market may be able to main-
tain higher prices and achieve greater profits by jointly licensing
one of the products and selling it at a fixed price.11 7 The patent
holder can coordinate the arrangement by granting manufacturing
licenses with the restriction that the products manufactured be sold
at a set price. ' 18 This may make the product more attractive to pro-
spective licensees in that it "then comes in a competition-free
wrapping." 119
In order to sustain an antitrust challenge, a plaintiff must show
that there was concerted action by the alleged conspirators. Addi-
tionally, a plaintiff must show that these actions were part of an
intentional scheme to reduce or eliminate competition.1 20 Parallel
conduct is not sufficient; there must be evidence that "concerted
save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because
knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict
consequences.
Id. at 49-50 n.15.
116. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687-
92 (1978) (discussing history of rule of reason while finding engineering society's
prohibition of competitive bidding to violate Sherman Act). Likewise, agreements
imposing territorial restraints might enhance overall competitiveness by improving
interbrand competition at the expense of intrabrand competition. See Continental
T.V., 433 U.S. at 54-55 (discussing market effects of vertical restrictions).
117. See United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 267 (1942). In this
case, Masonite and other manufacturers of building materials entered into cross-
licensing agreements that effectively made each manufacturer the agent of the
other manufacturers. Id. Under such an "agency" agreement, the manufacturers
could control the selling price of all goods in the market. Id. The Court ruled that
such an agreement violated the Sherman Act. Id. at 282.
118. See, e.g., General Elec., 272 U.S. at 489-94 (ruling that agreement at issue
did not violate antitrust law). Courts have drawn a distinction between restrictions
on the price of goods produced under a manufacturing agreement and restric-
tions on the price of goods sold per se. Id. For further discussion of General Elec-
tric, see supra note 102.
119. United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 47 (1960). In this case,
Parke Davis established a policy under which it would not deal with customers who
refused to follow its suggested resale price. Id. at 44-46. The Court reasoned that
this policy made Parke Davis' products more attractive to prospective licensees,
because such licensees would be assured that no other retailer was selling Parke
Davis' goods at a lower price. Id. at 46-47. The Parke Davis policy was found to
violate the Sherman Antitrust Act. Id. at 47-49.
120. See, e.g., Interstate Circuit, Inc., 306 U.S. 208, 221 (1939) (discussing
what plaintiff must show in order to establish violation of Sherman Act).
1234 [Vol. 39: p. 1209
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action was contemplated and invited." 21 Moreover, if the patent
holder has an independent business reason for entering into the
agreements, e.g., to protect the monopoly price, there is no con-
spiracy and no antitrust violation. 22 Thus, patent holders are en-
couraged to make a point of dealing with prospective licensees on
an individual and independent basis.
D. United States v. CIBA-Geigy
Many of the aspects of patent licensing described above are
illustrated by United States v. CIBA-Geigy Corp.123 In 1958, CIBA-
Geigy applied for a patent on hydrochlorothiazide ("HCT"), 124 a
diuretic used in the treatment of hypertension. 2 5 Because of
doubts concerning priority in the discovery of the drug, CIBA en-
tered into an agreement giving Merck & Co., Inc. a nonexclusive,
royalty-free license to make, use and sell the drug.12 6 The two com-
panies marketed HCT at about the same time, but, because of
Merck's superior drug marketing network, CIBA's prospects for
competing effectively appeared dim.'2 7
In an effort to distinguish its product from Merck's, CIBA com-
bined HCT with other drugs to produce "specialty products" with
altered therapeutic properties. 28 To compensate for Merck's
larger sales force, CIBA sold bulk quantities of HCT to other com-
121. Id. at 226.
122. Theatre Enters. Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541
(1954).
123. 508 F. Supp. 1118 (D.NJ. 1976).
124. Id. at 1124.
125. Id. at 1122-23.
126. Id. at 1124-25. CIBA applied for its patent on September 29, 1958. Id. at
1124. Merck had discovered HCT after CIBA, but filed for a patent three days
earlier. Id. Executives from the two companies met in December, 1958 and
reached an oral agreement in which each company granted the other an unlim-
ited license to sell HCT. Id. at 1125. This agreement was subsequently reduced to
writing. Id. CIBA believed itself substantially ahead of Merck in development, and
consequently, thought they could compensate for Merck's superior sales force by
introducing the drug into the market well ahead of Merck. Id. This "lead time"
was essential for CIBA because Merck was already strongly identified with diuretics
in the relevant market. Id. at 1126.
127. Id. at 1125-26. Merck was a major player in the development of pharma-
ceutical products for many years. Id. at 1124. In 1953, Merck executed a synergis-
tic merger with Sharp & Dome. Id. The companies formed a perfect complement
because while Merck was a powerhouse in research and development, they lacked
strong marketing. Id. Sharp & Dome lacked Merck's research capability, but had
an effective marketing organization. Id. The merger resulted in one company
with an exceptional ability to develop, manufacture and market its own products.
Id.
128. Id. at 1126-27.
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panies for reformulation. Although it wanted to take advantage of
the sales capabilities of these companies, CIBA did not want prod-
ucts marketed that might compete with the HCT specialty products
that CIBA itself was already selling.'2 9 Consequently, CIBA refused
to sell HCT to companies for reformulation unless they agreed to
limit their marketing of the drug to product combinations specifi-
cally approved by CIBA.130
In addition to selling large quantities of finished HCT to com-
panies for resale, CIBA licensed certain companies to manufacture
the drug.131 These agreements prohibited licensees from using the
manufactured drug in combinations not approved by CIBA. The
agreements also prohibited bulk sales of HCT by the licensee. i3 2
The government brought an antitrust action against CIBA
based upon two distinct theories of illegality. First, the government
alleged that the agreements restricting the use of HCT constituted
a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.133 Second, the
government alleged that in establishing the multiple licensing con-
tracts, CIBA had conspired with licensees to allocate markets and
boycott price cutters.13 4
With regard to the first allegation, the court drew a distinction
between CIBA's vending agreements and its manufacturing
129. Id. at 1127. The CIBA marketing policy was described in a December
1961 Memorandum to the CIBA Management Committee:
This Company's policy, developed over the past three years, has been to
supplement sales of the finished packaged forms by selling in bulk or
granting licenses on specific products where, in the opinion of the Mar-
keting Committee, such sales or licensing did not adversely affect sales of
the same product in specialty form.
Id.
130. Id. at 1127-28.
131. Id. at 1126. CIBA entered into a bulk sale and licensing agreement with
Abbott in 1959 and into agreements to sell bulk HCT to Warner-Lambert, G.D.
Searle Co., SKF, RMI, McNeil, Carter and Lemmon between 1959 and 1961. Id. In
addition, CIBA signed an agreement with Hoffman-LaRoche in 1965 for the bulk
sale of HCT. CIBA granted manufacturing rights to Lilly to use and sell CIBA's
cyclothiazide in specialty form in 1964. Id. at 1127.
132. Id. at 1129.
133. Id. at 1146. The court defined per se violations of § 1 of the Sherman
Act as "agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on compe-
tition and lack of any redeeming virtue we conclusively presumed to be unreasona-
ble and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have
caused of the business excuse for their use." Id. at 1147 (citations omitted). In this
case, the supply agreements constituted a pernicious antitrust violation because
CIBA had used its monopoly position to insulate itself from horizontal competition
by both selling bulk HCT to a number of drug companies and by competing with
those companies in the formulation of the bulk chemical into ethical specialties.
Id. at 1147.
134. Id. at 1146.
1236
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licenses. 3 5 In the vending agreements, the initial sale of HCT by
CIBA exhausted its patent rights. Therefore, the restrictions im-
posed by CIBA fell outside the scope of its patent and were subject
to review under the Sherman Act.136 The vending contracts be-
tween CIBA and the purchasers of bulk HCT had both horizontal
and vertical aspects to them.1 37 Although these contracts were
reached between parties in a vertical, supplier-purchaser relation-
ship, they were designed to limit horizontal competition between
CIBA and its vendees. 3 8 The district court stated: "Where it is
shown, as it is here, that a vertically imposed restraint is intended to
suppress horizontal competition, the court will treat the agreement
as the equivalent of a horizontal restraint of trade."1 39 Conse-
quently, the restrictions were held to be per se illegal.' 40
In contrast to the vending agreements, the manufacturing
licenses granted by CIBA were found to fall squarely within the
scope of invention as set forth by the Supreme Court. 41 Because
the manufacturing restrictions fell within CIBA's patent monopoly,
the court found them to be protected from attack under antitrust
law. 142 With regard to the government's allegation that CIBA had
conspired with its licensees to divide the HCT market and boycott
price cutters, the court found that the government had failed to
show intent on the part of CIBA.' 43 The district court stated:
The government has shown a series of agreements be-
tween CIBA and several other companies and, it has
shown that, by and large, these agreements contained sim-
ilarly restrictive provisions. However the evidence is insuf-
ficient to support a finding of the knowing concertedness
of action, the dedication to a common end, which is essen-
135. Id. at 1149. For further discussion of such a distinction, see the discus-
sion of United States v. General Electric, supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text.
136. CIBA-Geigy, 508 F. Supp. at 1146-47.
137. Id. For a discussion of vertical and horizontal agreements, see supra
notes 106-16 and accompanying text.
138. CIBA-Geigy, 508 F. Supp. at 1146.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1147.
141. The proper standard for assessing the legality of a patent license is the
"legitimate scope of the monopoly.... Thus the question arises whether the limi-
tation [s] ... contained in the [manufacturing] license transcended the bounds of
CIBA's patent on HCT.... In General Talking Pictures, the distinct 'fields of use'
were (a) the home use field, and (b) the commercial use field. How this division
... differs in its competition effect from CIBA's [restrictions] .. .is entirely un-
clear." Id. at 1150-51.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1147.
1994] 1237
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tial to an illegal combination or conspiracy.... More is
required to prove conspiracy than the parallel acceptance
by the vendees of CIBA's unilaterally imposed restraints,
and nothing more than this legitimately can be inferred
from the present proofs. 14 4
E. Acquisitions and Patent Pools
In a patent driven industry, companies may attempt to increase
profits or protect their market position by accumulating patents or
by combining their patents with those of other companies. The
consequences of each of these activities in terms of antitrust law is
considered separately below.
1. Patent Acquisitions
Patent acquisition may occur through internal development,
purchase or merger. 145 The accumulation of patents through a
company's own research efforts creates no antitrust problems what-
soever. 146 Regardless of their market position, firms are free to in-
novate and aggressively compete for patent rights to new
products.1 47 Similarly, the acquisition of patents from third parties
144. CIBA-Geigy, 508 F. Supp. at 1148-49 (citation omitted).
145. This may be distinguished from "patent pools" in which patent holders
combine their rights but retain ownership of the patents.
146. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966). The Court in
Grinnell described the second element under § 2 of the Sherman Act as "the willful
acquisition or maintenance of that [monopoly] power as distinguished from
growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen,
or historic accident." Id. at 570-71.
147. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 276 (2d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980). In this case, Berkey sued Kodak for anti-
trust violations primarily arising from Kodak's introduction of the 110 photo-
graphic system, including the "Pocket Instamatic" camera and new color print
film, Kodacolor II. Id. at 268. Other charges were wide-ranging and embraced
many of Kodak's activities of the preceding decade and beyond. Id. The Second
Circuit noted that a monopoly is not per se illegal. Id. at 273. Antitrust laws are
designed to enhance competition. Consequently, they should not be used against
a competitor simply because it was successful. Id. The Act does not condemn a
competitor who succeeds due to superior skill and intelligence. Id. at 274. A mo-
nopoly may not, however, be acquired or maintained through improper means.
Id. For example, the use of monopoly power to gain a competitive advantage in
acquiring new markets is a violation of § 2, whereas the use of inherent advantages,
such as more efficient production, greater ability to develop complementary prod-
ucts and reduced transaction costs are not. Id. at 276; see also California Computer
Prod. Inc. v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727, 744 (9th Cir. 1979) (stating that antitrust
laws do not restrict manufacturers' right to develop new products); United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 423 (2d Cir. 1945) (noting that antitrust laws
do not forbid growth even when it results in monopoly).
1238 [Vol. 39: p. 1209
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is not "in and of itself illegal." 148 Nevertheless, under certain cir-
cumstances, such acquisitions may constitute a violation of either
section 2 of the Sherman Act or section 7 of the Clayton Act. 149
a. Patent Acquisition as a Violation of Section 2 of the Sherman
Act
In United States v. Grinnell,150 the Supreme Court set forth the
elements necessary to establish monopolization:
The offense of monopoly under section 2 of the Sherman
Act has two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly
power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisi-
tion or maintenance of that power as distinguished from
growth or development as a consequence of a superior
product, business acumen or historic accident. 151
In establishing a section 2 violation, plaintiffs are aided by two
presumptions. First, there is a presumption of market power where
a company has a large market share. This presumption may be re-
butted by evidence that the company is, in fact, unable to control
price or product output.1 52 Second, companies are presumed to
148. Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research Inc., 339 U.S. 827, 834
(1950). The acquisition of patents only becomes illegal in cases where there is a
conspiracy to restrict the production of unpatented or other goods. Id. at 832.
149. For the language of § 2 of the Sherman Act, see supra note 10. For the
language of § 7 of the Clayton Act, see infra note 156. Under some circumstances,
§ 1 of the Sherman Act may also be used. See, e.g., McDonald v. Johnson & John-
son, 537 F. Supp. 1282 (D. Minn. 1982), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 722 F.2d 1370
(8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 870 (1984). An inverse situation was
presented in this case. Johnson & Johnson acquired the StimTech corporation
and then prevented StimTech from developing new products. Id. at 1332. The
court found Johnson &Johnson's suppression of StimTech a violation of § 1 of the
Sherman Act. Id. at 1334. For an in-depth examination of McDonald v. Johnson &
Johnson, see infra notes 183-222 and accompanying text. For the language of § 1 of
the Sherman Act, see supra note 90.
150. 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
151. Id. at 570-71. The above text deals only with claims of monopolization.
A claim of "attempted monopolization" may also be brought under § 2. For a
discussion of the elements required to establish such a claim in the context of an
acquisition case, see McDonald, 537 F. Supp. at 340-46. For an examination of
McDonald, see supra notes 183-222 and accompanying text.
152. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 578 (1966). Even a com-
pany having a 100% market share may not have market power if there are no
barriers to entry into the market. See, e.g., United States v. Syufy Enter., 712 F.
Supp. 1386, 1401 (N.D. Cal. 1989), aff'd, 903 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1990). For a dis-
cussion of the factors that go into the determination of a product market, see 1984
Dept. of. Justice Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26823. The guidelines define a
market as "a group of products and a geographical area such that a hypothetical
firm that is the only present and future seller of those products in that area would
possess market power." Id. Market power is defined as the power to control prices
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intend the "necessary and direct consequences of their acts." 153
Therefore, the mere fact that a defendant's activities had an an-
ticompetitive effect may be all that is needed to establish intent. 154
The net effect of these presumptions is that the acquisition of pat-
ents by a firm which already occupies a dominant market position
will usually constitute a violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act. 155
b. Patent Acquisition as a Violation of Section 7 of the Clayton
Act
Under section 7 of the Clayton Act, one company may not ac-
quire the assets of another company where "the effect of such ac-
quisition may be substantially to lessen competition or to tend to
create a monopoly."156 Patents are a form of property constituting
by restricting output. Id. Even if a company is the only supplier of a product, it
does not have market power if attempts to raise prices drive buyers elsewhere. Id.
153. United States v. Masonite, 316 U.S. 265, 274 (1942) (citing United States
v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525, 543 (1913)).
154. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585,
602 (1985) (stating that intent can be inferred from attempt to monopolize);
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 342 (D. Mass. 1953)
(identifying one of three approaches to finding intent under § 2 as inferred by
mere fact of monopolization), aff'd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). The presumption may
be rebutted if the defendant can show that the anticompetitive consequences of an
act could not have been foreseen at the time that it occurred. SCM v. Xerox
Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1205 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1016 (1982). The
court in SCM found the patent would be "seriously undermined" if the threat of
antitrust liability attached at the time a patent was acquired and before the exist-
ence of a relevant market or the commercialization of the patented product. Id.
155. See, e.g., Kobe Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416 (10th Cir. 1952),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 837 (1952). Kobe involved a monopoly in the field of hydraulic
pumps for oil wells. Id. at 418. The court noted that intent with respect to monop-
olies need not include specific intent in the criminal sense. Id. at 423. Unification
of power and control over a commodity can create a prima facie case of intent to
exercise illegal restraints and monopolize. Id. Evidence leading to a presumption
of intent in Kobe included: evidence that every important patent relating to the
field had been acquired by Kobe; that no other similar pump was manufactured
until Dempsey put one on the market; and that Kobe widely publicized the
number of patents it owned. Id. at 423-24; see also United States v. Besser Mfg. Co.,
96 F. Supp. 304 (E.D. Mich. 1951), aff'd, 343 U.S. 444 (1952). In Besser, the district
court found that a monopoly existed because two closely related companies had
65% of the dollar value of the industry and their nearest competitor had less than
8%. Id. at 307. Intent was presumed based on Besser's history of purchasing ex-
isting or prospective competitors, and on the existence of a contract under which
Besser and its largest competitor gave one another exclusive rights to all future
developments of two particularly fertile inventors. Id. at 308-10.
156. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 731 (1914) (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 18 (1994)). In its entirety, the relevant language of§ 7 of the Clayton Act
reads:
No person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting com-
merce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the
stock or other share capital and no person subject to the jurisdiction of
the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the
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the assets of a company and their acquisition is therefore subject to
review under section 7.157 Analysis under this provision is aimed at
predicting the likely effect of an acquisition on future competition
within a market and is heavily influenced by the structure of the
market at the time of acquisition.158
In a decentralized industry, where market share is relatively
evenly divided among many firms, courts make a broad based in-
quiry into factors such as the market share of a firm after acquisi-
tion, industry trends, and whether there are barriers to entry into
the market.159 In a concentrated market,160 an acquisition result-
ing in a firm controlling an unusually large share of the market
assets of another person engaged also in commerce or in any activity af-
fecting commerce, where in any line of commerce or in any activity affect-
ing commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition
may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a
monopoly.
Id.
157. United States v. Lever Bros. Co., 216 F. Supp. 887, 889 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
The court held that patents were assets because both the patent itself and the
ultimate finished product were valuable. Id.
158. Analysis under § 7 of the Clayton Act is prospective in the sense that
courts must predict whether future anticompetitive effects are likely to result from
an acquisition. This may be contrasted with the retrospective analysis of § 2 of the
Sherman Act where courts must determine whether anticompetitive effects have
already occurred. See generally United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353
U.S. 586, 595 (1957) (requiring government to prove likelihood that competition
will be foreclosed in order to support § 7 violation); Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d at 1208
(noting that § 2 of Sherman Act requires examination of power party already pos-
sesses in relevant market before imposing limitations on patent rights).
159. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). The Brown Shoe
Court found persuasive evidence of trends toward vertical integration and the ten-
dency for acquiring manufacturers to become the primary suppliers for their ac-
quired outlets. Id. at 332. The corollary of such trends was the foreclosure of
independent manufacturers from those markets. Id. Even in cases where an in-
dustry is composed of a large number of manufacturers and retailers, the Brown
Shoe Court would consider such trends an appropriate means of predicting future
results. Id. at 333. There can be a violation of § 7 even when the post-acquisition
firm has only a small market share. For example, a violation could be found if the
market showed a trend toward becoming more concentrated. See, e.g., United
States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 278 (1966) (finding that merger between
two already thriving companies violates § 7 when it occurs in rmarket characterized
by continuous trend toward fewer owner-competitors).
160. An example of a concentrated market would be one where the four lead-
ing firms have a combined market share of 60% or more. See United States v.
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 366 (1963). This case involved a proposed
merger between Girard Bank and Philadelphia National Bank (PNB). Id. at 331.
The Court found that the merger of these two banks would result in the remaining
single bank controlling at least 30% of the commercial banking business in the
four-county Philadelphia Metropolitan area. Id. at 364. The Court defined the
relevant market narrowly, looking to "where, within the area of competitive over-
lap, the effect of the merger on competition will be direct." Id. at 357.
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(e.g., greater than thirty percent) is presumptively illegal. 161 This
presumption may be rebutted if a defendant can present a convinc-
ing argument that the acquisition is, in fact, unlikely to affect com-
petition 162 or that its procompetitive effects are likely to outweigh
its anticompetitive effects.163 Both patent acquisitions and the ac-
quisition of exclusive rights under a patent have been found to vio-
late the Clayton Act.' 64
161. Id. at 365. In finding that a 30% market share posed a risk of undue
concentration, the Court looked to three factors. First, the Court noted that nu-
merous commentators had suggested that percentages lower than 30% were suffi-
cient to establish prima facie illegality. Id. at 364 & n.42. Second, the Court noted
that numerous previous cases found illegality despite the fact that the acquiring
company accounted for less than 30% of the market share. Id. at 366. Finally, the
Court found that the merger of Girard and PNB would result in the merged bank
and its largest competitor together controlling 59% of the relevant market. Id. at
365.
162. See, e.g., United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 498
(1974). In General Dynamics, the government offered statistical evidence concern-
ing market share and market concentration sufficient to establish its case under
ordinary circumstances. Id. at 497. However, the Supreme Court held that perti-
nent additional factors existed that justified finding that a substantial lessening of
competition had not occurred and was not threatened. Id. at 498. The Court
noted that Congress had plainly indicated that mergers were to be viewed func-
tionally, in the context of the particular industry. Id. Here, the district court prop-
erly considered evidence concerning the structure, history and probable future of
the coal industry before finding that there was no substantial probability of an-
ticompetitive effects from the merger. Id.
163. See, e.g., United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 119
(1975). This case involved the elimination of Georgia's anti-branching law which
had previously prevented banks located in cities from operating branches in subur-
ban areas. Id. at 89. Subsequently, Citizens & Southern National Bank (C & S
National) formed Citizens & Southern Holding Company. (C & S Holding) for
the purpose of developing de facto branch banks in the suburbs of Atlanta. Id.
When Georgia amended its banking laws, C & S National implemented steps to
acquire the de facto branch banks. Id. at 90. The Court found that, contrary to
the government's assertion that such acquisition was a violation of both the Sher-
man and Clayton Acts, it was the Georgia antibranching law that was anticompeti-
tive. Id. at 118. This was because the effect of the law was to make potential bank
customers in rural areas a captive market for small local banks. Id. Thus, by mak-
ing new banking options available to suburban Atlanta, the acquisitions were actu-
ally procompetitive. Id. at 119.
164. Patent acquisitions have, on occasion, been found to violate the Clayton
Act. See, e.g., Dole Valve Co. v. Perfection Bar Equip., Inc., 311 F. Supp. 459, 463
(N.D. l. 1970) (noting that patents may be considered part of the assets of corpo-
ration for § 7 purposes). The acquisition of exclusive rights under a patent has
also been found to violate the Clayton Act. See, e.g., United States v. Columbia
Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp. 153, 181-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). Among other issues, the
court in Columbia Pictures decided that an exclusive, limited license under copy-
right was an asset within the meaning of § 7 of the Clayton Act. Id. at 183. The
court found the terms of the statute to be generic, encompassing a wide variety of
transactions. Id. at 182. The concern of the statute emphasizes the economic ef-
fect of the transfer rather than the character of the transfer itself. Id. Thus, the
court found that for purposes of § 7, an acquisition could be a "purchase, assign-
ment, lease, license, or otherwise." Id. Contra Benger Lab. Ltd. v. R.K. Laros Co.,
1242
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2. Patent Pools (Cross-Licensing Agreements)
Patent pools occur when two or more patent holders form an
agreement in which they combine their patent fights for a common
purpose. Such agreements may be formed for legitimate reasons
such as avoiding litigation,165 gaining access to technology neces-
sary for new product development' 66 or providing a package of
related patents for licensees. 167 Nevertheless, the cross-licensing
agreements that typically form the basis of patent pools can, in ex-
treme cases, provide a means for controlling competition within an
entire industry.168
Because patent pools may have either procompetitive or an-
ticompetitive effects, they are analyzed under the rule of reason.169
317 F.2d 455, 456 (3d Cir. 1962) (finding no evidence that exclusive licenses vio-
late antitrust laws), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 833 (1963).
165. Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 171 (1931). The
patents in question in Standard Oil contained provisions for the division of royal-
ties. Id. The government alleged that these provisions were unlawful under the
Sherman Act because they constituted evidence of an intent to form a monopoly.
Id. The Court found to the contrary, noting that such provisions represent an
agreement designed to avoid further litigation. Id. Contra United States v. Singer
Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 197 (1963) (stating that patent holder cannot escape
prohibitions of Sherman Act by aggregating patents).
166. See, e.g., International Mfg. Co. v. Landon, Inc., 336 F.2d 723, 730 (9th
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 988 (1965). This case involved the mandatory
package licensing of two patents in a pool in which the patent holders agreed to
license the patents collectively and share royalties according to a set formula. Id. at
729. The trial court found that the two patents covered only a single article in the
sense that manufacturers could not use one patent without infringing the other.
Id. The court distinguished this agreement from "tying arrangements," which in-
volve the forced purchase of a second commodity distinct from the first. Id. at 730.
167. See, e.g., Baker-Cammack Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Davis Co., 181 F.2d 550,
570 (4th Cir.) (combining complementary patents is not illegal unless combina-
tion is used for improper purposes), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 824 (1950). See generally
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1979)
(explaining that blanket license provides acceptable way for large part of relevant
market to gain access to copyrighted musical compositions and performance
rights). Although Broadcast Music involved the blanket licensing of copyrights, the
principles set forth are equally applicable to patent licensing.
168. Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 406 (1945). Here,
12 corporations and 101 individuals were named defendants in a suit charging
conspiracy and intent to monopolize interstate and foreign commerce by acquir-
ing patents covering the manufacture of glass making machinery. These patents
effectively excluded others from a fair opportunity to engage in the manufacture
and distribution of glass products. Id. at 392. In upholding the district court's
finding that the defendants participated in an illegal conspiracy, the Court noted
that the proper test is whether the alleged acts regulated and suppressed competi-
tion in the industry. Id. at 406.
169. Standard Oi4 283 U.S. at 171. The test the Court applied was whether the
available advantages were open on reasonable terms to all manufacturers desiring
to participate. Id. If so, then the arrangement promotes rather than restrains
competition. Id.
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Two crucial factors go into determining whether a particular patent
pool violates antitrust law. 170 First, courts examine whether the pat-
ents, when combined, lead to market power. Early court decisions
suggested that no violation of antitrust law occurs without a show-
ing that the pooled patents control a dominant share of a mar-
ket.171 More recent decisions have stated that while dominant
market share remains an important indicator of market power, 172 it
is not an absolute requirement.173 Second and most importantly,
courts analyze whether a particular patent pool has a procompeti-
tive or an anticompetitive effect. This analysis is complicated by the
fact that two distinct markets are associated with pooled patents:
(1) a market for the products covered by the patents; and (2) a
market for the licensing of the patents themselves. In addition,
courts must consider the economic relationship of the patents in-
volved. Three types of relationships are possible; the patents may
be competing, complementary or blocking.' 74
a. Competing Patents
Competing patents are those that licensees would consider to
170. Most typically, agreements are analyzed under § 1 of the Sherman Act.
For the language of § 1 of the Sherman Act, see supra note 90.
171. Standard Oil, 283 U.S. at 174.
172. United States v. Krasnov, 143 F. Supp. 184, 199 (E.D. Pa. 1956) (finding
patent pools illegal where two largest competitors in relevant industry fixed prices,
controlled key patents and only granted rights under those patents by mutual con-
sent), aff 'd per curiam, 355 U.S. 5 (1957).
173. See, e.g., Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S.
827, 834 (1950) (noting that mere accumulation of even large number patents is
not per se illegal); see also Mason City Tent & Awning Co. v. Clapper, 144 F. Supp.
754, 767 (W.D. Mo. 1956) (finding § 2 violation even though licensees continued
to compete); United States v. Associated Patents, Inc., 134 F. Supp. 74, 82 (E.D.
Mich. 1955) (finding that combined effect of patent pooling agreement imposed
unreasonable restraint on trade). One reason why the market power of pooled
patents might not be reflected in a dominant market share is that license fees on
the patents may have been made so prohibitively high that other, inferior
processes or products have been made competitive. Roger B. Andewelt, Analysis of
Patent Pools Under the Antitrust Laws, 53 ANTrrRUST LJ. 611, 623-26 (1984).
Andewelt points to the inherent difference between intellectual property and
more traditional assets to explain why market share is of less significance in analyz-
ing the competitive affect of patent pools. Id. at 624. For example, a company
seeking to increase its production of conventional products will inevitably face
some increased costs and delays. Id. Market share, therefore, is a good indicator
of short-term supply. Id. Intellectual property, on the other hand, can be sold
repeatedly without being used up and the cost of new sales may be only marginally
greater than the cost of providing individualized licenses. Id. Under these circum-
stances, a company can easily expand to dominate an entire market. Conse-
quently, market share may not be a reliable indicator of future market power. Id.
at 625.
174. See Andewelt, supra note 173, at 612-14 (identifying patent relationships
as competing, complementary and blocking).
1244 [Vol. 39: p. 1209
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be effective substitutes for one another.175 For example, suppose
Company A has a patent on a process for producing X and Com-
pany B has a patent on an alternative process. Licensees are likely
to compare the characteristics of each process and license either
one or the other. If Company A's process is less efficient than B's,
it may attempt to attract licensees by charging a lower royalty rate
or by offering better support services. Ultimately, this competition
in the patent license market should be reflected in the product
market.
Licensing restrictions imposed on pooled competing patents,
which together may exert market power, are very likely to have an
anticompetitive effect.176 Suppose that in the above example A and
B join together and refuse to license either patent below a specified
price. If their patented processes represent the only reasonable
means of producing X, licensees could be forced to pay higher roy-
alties than if the patentees had remained in competition. Pooling
under such circumstances would be a clear violation of the Sher-
man Act.177
b. Complementary Patents
Complementary patents act synergistically, each increasing the
value of the other.178 Suppose Company A has a patent on drug X
which is safe and effective but which must be given intravenously
175. Id. at 613.
176. At times, patent holders may enter into a cross-licensing agreement
which gives each company access to the other's inventions but which imposes no
restrictions on how patent rights are licensed or on how the inventions are used.
See, e.g., United States v. CIBA-Geigy Corp., 508 F. Supp. 1118, 1125 (D.N.J. 1976)
(illustrating agreement under which each participating company received non-ex-
clusive, non-transferable license under any patent issued on pending patent appli-
cations). However, even these arrangements can be anticompetitive if the pool
involves a large segment of an industry or requires its members to contribute fu-
ture patents to the pool. See, e.g., United States v. Manufacturers Aircraft Assoc.,
Inc., 1976-1 Trade Cases 1 60,810 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (ordering aircraft manufactur-
ers' association and its members to grant licenses for aircraft patents upon written
request); United States v. Automobile Mfrs. Assoc., 1969 Trade Cases 1 72,907
(C.D. Cal. 1969) (prohibiting four automobile manufacturers and their trade asso-
ciation from, among other things, exchanging patent rights covering future inven-
tions because their intent was to suppress development of pollution control
devices).
177. See, e.g., United States v. General Instrument Corp., 87 F. Supp. 157, 195
(D.N.J. 1949). In General Instrument, three principal manufacturers of variable con-
densors formed a patent holding company. Id. at 167. The court found that the
manufacturers illegally used the holding company to pool patents and effectively
fix prices industry wide. Id. at 179. In addition, evidence was submitted revealing
that the holding company charged exorbitant royalties and inequitably refused
licenses in an effort to dominate the industry. Id. at 194-95.
178. Andewelt, supra note 173, at 613.
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and in multiple doses over a period of days. Under such circum-
stances, physicians might consider X to be unsuitable for all but
hospitalized patients. Company B discovers and patents product Y
which, when combined with X or other intravenous drugs, allows
them to be absorbed through the skin. X and Y are complementary
in that they have made each other more useful and more valuable.
Unlike the case for competing patents, a party who obtains a license
to the patent rights of X will, if anything, be more likely to license Y.
Patent pools involving complementary patents are therefore likely
to be procompetitive. 79
c. Blocking Patents
Blocking patents occur in situations where a pioneer patent is
owned by one inventor or assignee and an improvement patent is
owned by another.18 0 The latter patent cannot be practiced with-
out infringing the former. For example, suppose Company A has a
patent on drug X. Company B discovers and patents a process for
making X which is far more efficient than the process used by A.
Although B can prevent A from using the patented process, it can-
not exercise the patent without infringing upon A's right to ex-
clude others from making X.181 A's patent is said to be "blocking"
and B's patent is said to be "blocked." As with complementary pat-
ents, pooling arrangements involving blocking patents will usually
be procompetitive182
F. McDonald v. Johnson & Johnson183
Research in the late 1960s and early 1970s indicated that pain
179. Id. Another example is a patent covering the manufacture of pen refills
and a patent covering the manufacture of the outside pen structure. Id. Because
these patents are interrelated, access to one increases the demand for the other.
Id.
180. Id. at 613-14.
181. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1988). Section 217(c) provides:
Whoever sells a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combi-
nation or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a
patented process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing
the same to be especially made or especially adopted for use in an in-
fringement of such patent... shall be liable as a contributory infringer.
Id.
182. See, e.g., International Mfg. Co. v. Landon, Inc., 336 F.2d 723, 729 (9th
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 988 (1965). This case involved the mandatory
package licensing of two patents so closely related that no commercially feasible
device could be manufactured unless the patents were combined. The Ninth Cir-
cuit stated: "In a case involving blocking patents [a patent pooling] arrangement
is the only reasonable method of making the invention available." Id. at 729.
183. 537 F. Supp. 1282 (D. Minn. 1982), aff'd in part, vacated inparA 722 F.2d
1246 [Vol. 39: p. 1209
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could be controlled by the electrical stimulation of nerves at the
pain site.18 4 In 1971, Norman Hagfors founded StimTech, a com-
pany devoted to the development and commercialization of a trans-
cutaneous electric nerve stimulator ("TENS") for controlling
pain.1 85 In the following two years, he was joined by Stanley Mc-
Donald and Clayton Jensen.186 The company quickly took a lead-
ing position in TENS technology, developing the first
therapeutically effective solid state device.18 7 Clinical studies indi-
cated that TENS technology could be used in the treatment of
headaches, back pain, post-surgical pain and phantom limb pain. 88
Realizing that it would take several years for TENS therapy to
gain medical acceptance, StimTech searched for an interim source
of income.' 89 After considerable effort, the company obtained a
license to distribute pacemakers made by Devices, Ltd.190 Never-
theless, the corporate partners in StimTech determined that they
would need an additional $7,000,000 to perfect and market their
1370 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 870 (1984). The case illustrates how
antitrust laws act to discourage the use of acquisitions to suppress competition.
184. Id. at 1289-90. In 1965, two medical doctors published a paper entitled
"The Gate Theory of Pain" which described a surgically implantable device that
prevented the transmission of pain signals to the brain. 1d. at 1289. This paper
sparked an interest in the development of such a device. Id. Thus, in the late
1960s, Mr. Hagfors, Dr. Donlin Long, a neurosurgeon at the University of Minne-
sota, and several other experts in the field of pain control created a device that,
when implanted, would stimulate nerves to alleviate certain kinds of pain. Id.
185. Id. at 1289.
186. Id. at 1290-91.
187. Id. at 1289-90. Mr. Hagfors, in conjunction with Dr. Long, created the
first modern solid state TENS device. Id. at 1290. StimTech was the dominant
company in the TENS industry and controlled approximately 25% to 30% of sales.
Id. at 1332.
188. Id. at 1291. During 1972, StimTech was involved in product research
and market evaluation in an effort to expand its products and its sales territory. 1d.
In clinical studies, TENS had already proven to be an effective alternative to drugs
for the treatment of headaches, back pain, post-surgical pain and phantom limb
pain. Id. Unlike strong painkillers, TENS had virtually no side effects. Id. The
clinical studies also suggested that TENS technology might be applied to other
areas, such as sports medicine. Id.
189. Id. at 1290-91. Usually when a company is promoting a new drug or
device, it seeks a physician's endorsement to make customers feel more comforta-
ble about using the product. Id. at 1290. In order to inform physicians about the
product, however, a company must provide research articles disclosing experi-
ments and patient surveys. Id. This is not only time consuming, but extremely
expensive. Id. StimTech planned to sell heart pacemakers, a well-accepted prod-
uct, in order to fund research on the TENS device. Id.
190. Id. at 1291. McDonald and Hagfors began searching for a foreign manu-
facturer of pacemakers in the hope of establishing a licensing arrangement. Id. at
1290. In October of 1971, Hagfors and McDonald reached an agreement under
which StimTech would distribute and manufacture pacemakers for Devices, Ltd.,
an English company, in the United States. Id. at 1291.
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product.1 91 They were contacted by a representative from Johnson
& Johnson, a leading company in the sale of analgesics for control-
ling pain.' 92 Johnson &Johnson proposed to use its resources to
promote the rapid development and commercialization of TENS
technology in return for an ownership interest in StimTech.
During negotiations, Johnson & Johnson loaned StimTech ap-
proximately $300,000 in urgently needed capital. 193 Immediately
before a final agreement was reached, StimTech learned that John-
son & Johnson had purchased Devices, Ltd.194 With StimTech's
only significant source of income now controlled by Johnson &
Johnson and $300,000 debt also owing to Johnson & Johnson, Mc-
Donald, Hagfors and Jensen accepted an agreement under which
they relinquished all control of the company. 195 Furthermore, each
191. Id. at 1292.
192. Id. at 1292-93. From mid-1972 to mid-1973, StimTech contacted numer-
ous investors in an attempt to provide the remaining $7 million. Id. During this
time, Dr. McConnell, the Director of Corporate Development forJohnson &John-
son, approached StimTech. Id.
193. Id. at 1297.
194. Id. at 1294-97. When Dr. McConnell began negotiating for acquisition
of StimTech in the summer of 1973, he informed StimTech that he was also inter-
ested in acquiring Devices, Ltd. Id. at 1294. At this time, Hagfors saw no problem
with Johnson &Johnson acquiring both companies. He even wrote a letter to the
chairman of Devices, Ltd. stating that theJohnson &Johnson acquisition would be
a great opportunity. Id. at 1296. Johnson & Johnson and StimTech negotiated
various details of the acquisition from the summer of 1973 to May 1974. Id. at
1296-97. On May 9, 1974, StimTech was informed that the $12 million earn-out
proposal for acquisition of StimTech would be presented toJohnson &Johnson on
May 10, 1974. Id. at 1297. StimTech was unaware that Johnson & Johnson was
extremely close to closing the deal on the acquisition of Devices, Ltd. Id. A propo-
sal for acquisition of StimTech for $8 million rather than the negotiated $12 mil-
lion earn-out was presented toJohnson &Johnson's Executive Committee and on
May 20, 1974, Mr. Anderson from Johnson &Johnson presented a take-it-or-leave-
it offer of $6.5 million to StimTech. Id. at 1298. At the same time he notified
StimTech thatJohnson &Johnson's acquisition of Devices, Ltd. had been success-
ful. Id.
195. Id. at 1297-1300. By acquiring Devices, Ltd., Johnson &Johnson had the
power to cease Devices' production of pacemakers, thereby eliminating
StimTech's source of funds for the development of TENS. Id. at 1297-98. This
fact, combined with StimTech's inability to repay the borrowed $300,000, made
StimTech realize that its negotiating position withJohnson &Johnson had become
extremely difficult. Id. at 1297-98. As a result, StimTech agreed to the acquisition.
Id.
Mr. Anderson, the individual who took over negotiations after Dr. McConnell,
maintained thatJohnson &Johnson had no intention of competing with StimTech
nor disposing of StimTech's business. Nevertheless, Anderson refused StimTech's
proposed contract provisions under which Johnson & Johnson would agree not to
compete with TENS devices or pacemakers and that it would not sell or dispose of
StimTech during the earn-out period. Id. at 1299. In addition, Anderson refused
to place in the agreement the specific representations thatJohnson &Johnson had
made to StimTech over the period of negotiations, but merely stated in the con-
tract that the agreement was based on "mutual trust." Id. at 1299.
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of the partners signed an agreement making them employees of
StimTech and prohibiting them from competing with the company
for a period of five years. 196
After acquiring StimTech, Johnson & Johnson adopted a pol-
icy of keeping the company solvent but suppressing any actions that
might provide it with more than a subsistence level of income.
Among other things, Johnson & Johnson prohibited advertising of
StimTech devices and squelched attempts by McDonald and others
to solicit outside support or support from otherJohnson &Johnson
subsidiaries. 197 In addition, Johnson & Johnson imposed price re-
strictions that deprived StimTech of any significant profits and dis-
tribution restrictions that effectively shut down much of the world
market. 198
Johnson & Johnson established a line of credit that StimTech
could use to pay its debts and avoid bankruptcy. Keeping StimTech
alive, if not healthy, effectively discouraged other companies from
developing TENS technology. Small competitors in the TENS field
viewed StimTech's association with Johnson & Johnson as giving it
access to tremendous resources and the ability to quickly copy and
market any innovations that a competitor might introduce. 199 Be-
cause of this perceived power, competitors adopted a policy of fol-
lowing safely behind StimTech and trying to hold on to the small
percentage of the TENS market they already p6ssessed. 00
During the same period in which Johnson & Johnson was sup-
pressing the development of TENS, it was heavily promoting the
sales of its analgesics, Tylenol and Zomax. As a result of these ef-
forts, Tylenol with codeine rose from 127th in prescription sales in
1971 to number one in 1980.201 Also by 1980, Tylenol had become
After the stock purchase agreement was finalized, StimTech became a wholly
owned subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson who then instituted numerous policy
changes that left McDonald, Hagfors and Jensen with little control. Id. at 1300.
Anderson became Chairman of the Board for StimTech and Devices, Ltd., and
thus could overrule StimTech's president, Hagfors. Id. Mr. Anderson began mak-
ing all management decisions at StimTech and relieved McDonald, Hagfors, and
Jensen of any effective role in running the company. Id. As a result of employ-
ment contracts, noncompete clauses and divestment of stock, McDonald, Hagfors
and Jensen were deprived of any role other than that of employee. Id.
196. Id. On September 20, 1974, McDonald, Hagfors and Jensen signed
three year employment contracts. Id. Each also signed an agreement not to com-
pete in either the pacemaker industry or the pain control industry for five years,
except as employees of StimTech. Id.
197. Id. at 1332, 1334-35.
198. Id. at 1333-34.
199. Id. at 1333-35.
200. Id. at 1335.
201. Id. at 1310.
1994] 1249
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the leader in the over-the-counter analgesics market with a share
greater than the next three competitive drugs combined. 20 2
In 1979, a jury in the District Court for the District of Minne-
sota found that Johnson & Johnson had violated both sections 1
and 2 of the Sherman Act in its dealings with McDonald, Hagfors
and Jensen. 20 3 On motion for a new trial, the court reviewed the
jury's findings and, as summarized below, affirmed its decision. 20 4
1. Johnson &Johnson as Liable Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act
Acquisition cases do not usually involve claims based on section
1 of the Sherman Act. If one competitor voluntarily sells its assets
to another, it has, by choice, withdrawn from competition and does
not have standing to bring an antitrust action. 20 5 Here however,
there was clear evidence that StimTech did not intend to withdraw
from competition at all. Johnson &Johnson had promised McDon-
ald and his partners that it would promote StimTech's technology
and that the acquisition would actually allow the company to com-
pete more effectively. The jury found thatJohnson &Johnson sub-
202. Id. Gross sales of Tylenol from 1975 to 1979 amounted to $200,000,000,
representing a net profit of $134,000,000. Id. at 1311.
203. Id. at 1288-89. On May 2, 1979, Hagfors,Jensen and McDonald filed suit
against Johnson & Johnson alleging an attempt to suppress competition in viola-
tion of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, and § 7 of the Clayton Act. Id. at 1288.
After nearly six months of trial, the jury found for the plaintiffs and awarded
$56,800,000.00 (before trebling) for the violations of the Sherman Act. Id. at 1289.
204. Id. Johnson & Johnson moved for judgment not withstanding the ver-
dict, or for a new trial. The district court denied the motions. Id.
205. Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 643 F.2d 1229, 1231-35 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 893 (1981). Chrysler sued Fedders Corporation for violations of
several antitrust laws. Id. at 1231. Chrysler had agreed to sell to Fedders substan-
tially all of Chrysler's Airtemp Division's assets. Id. The agreement contained a
covenant not to compete in the air conditioning market for five years. Id. When
Fedders Corporation failed to pay money owed under the agreement, Chrysler
brought suit, alleging that Fedder's breach of the agreement violated antitrust stat-
utes. Id. at 1231-35. The Sixth Circuit held that to have standing in an antitrust
action, the plaintiff must prove: (1) injury in fact; and (2) that the interest that the
plaintiff is seeking to protect falls within the statute in question. Id. The court
then referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-a
Mat, which instructed courts to focus on "the type of injury pleaded and its rela-
tionship to the alleged anticompetitive conduct." 429 U.S. 477 (1977). The Sixth
Circuit held that Chrysler's alleged injuries did not amount to "anti-trust injury."
Chrysler, 643 F.2d at 1235. The court determined that by selling substantially all of
its assets, Chrysler had "voluntarily" withdrawn from the non-automotive air condi-
tioning market. Id. The court then reasoned that Chrysler would have been elimi-
nated from competition regardless of the breach of the agreement for reasons
unrelated to alleged antitrust violations. Id. Consequently, the damage that
Chrysler suffered by being unable to compete in the non-automotive air condition-
ing industry lacked the "essential connection between injury and the aims of the
antitrust laws" which are imperative to establishing standing. Id. (quoting A.D.M.
Corp. v. Sigma Instruments, Inc., 688 F.2d 753 (1st Cir. 1980)).
1250 [Vol. 39: p. 1209
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sequently broke its promises and engaged in actions that prevented
StimTech from aggressively competing in the pain control mar-
ket.20 6 McDonald, Hagfors and Jensen, as the sole owners of
StimTech, were economically injured as a result ofJohnson &John-
son's actions and therefore had standing to sue.2 0 7 On appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the
antitrust convictions on standing grounds.208 Despite the standing
reversal, the case illustrates how antitrust law operates to discourage
acquisitions done for the purpose of suppressing competition.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act requires that a defendant have
participated in some type of agreement or conspiracy designed to
restrict competition. 209 In attempting to impede the development
of StimTech, Johnson & Johnson often acted through one of its
subsidiaries. Although a corporation cannot generally conspire
with a wholly owned subsidiary,210 the district court found that, in
this particular instance, the subsidiaries were sufficiently independ-
ent to be considered autonomous and capable of conspiring with
Johnson & Johnson.211
Whether the restraints of trade imposed by an agreement will
be treated under the rule of reason or as per se violations of anti-
trust law depends upon whether the restraints are the main pur-
206. McDonald, 537 F. Supp. at 1329. Relying heavily on Chrysler, the defend-
ants, Johnson & Johnson, challenged the plaintiffs' standing. Id. They claimed
that the plaintiffs withdrew from the market when they sold their business to the
defendants. Id. The court in McDonald distinguished Chrysler based on extensive
evidence that the plaintiffs did not intend to withdraw from the TENS industry,
despite the noncompetition agreement. Id. Examples of plaintiffs' intention to
compete included: (1) the pre-agreement acquisition of additional funds to fur-
ther develop their TENS device; (2) the fact that the acquisition was to provide
resources to continue development of the TENS device; and (3) representations
by Johnson & Johnson that it would facilitate the development of StimTech's
TENS device. Id. at 1299, 1329. Beyond this, Johnson &Johnson had promised
the use of its own sales force and sales organization worldwide, to facilitate the
acceptance of StimTech's device. Id. at 1299.
207. Id. at 1289 (denying motion for new trial and judgment notwithstanding
the verdict).
208. McDonald v. Johnson & Johnson, 722 F.2d 1370, 1373 (8th Cir. 1983).
The Eighth Circuit disagreed on this crucial point and reversed the antitrust con-
victions on standing grounds. Unlike the lower court, the appellate court found
that the plaintiffs had voluntarily withdrawn from the pain control market. McDon-
ald, 722 F.2d at 1377.
209. For the complete language of § 1 of the Sherman Act, see supra note 90.
210. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 777
(1984) (noting that in administration of antitrust laws, theory that parent and
wholly owned subsidiary can "conspire" has been rejected).
211. McDonald, 537 F. Supp. at 1336 (reflecting that Johnson &Johnson and
its subsidiaries do not function as one company).
1994] 1251
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pose of the agreement or are ancillary to the main purpose.2 12 The
McDonald court found overwhelming evidence that Johnson &
Johnson had deliberately followed a plan specifically designed to
restrain competition. 213 Consequently, the district court found that
Johnson &Johnson had committed a per se violation of section 1 of
the Sherman Act.214 No further inquiry was made into the actual
212. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
213. McDonald, 537 F. Supp. at 1331-36. The court noted over 26 ways in
which Johnson & Johnson had intentionally suppressed competition by StimTech.
Id. at 1333-34. These included: delaying the production of new TENS devices;
denying StimTech necessary funding; prohibiting StimTech from displaying their
TENS devices at annual meetings or from marketing StimTech's products with
Johnson & Johnson's name; denying increases in research and product develop-
ment; firing the plaintiffs who developed the original TENS devices; rejecting or-
ders for the TENS devices; limiting StimTech's advertising; and refusing to resell
StimTech to the plaintiffs. Id Johnson & Johnson refused to use Dr. Long as a
consultant, but also prevented him from helping anyone else in the TENS indus-
try. Id. at 1334. Johnson &Johnson also prohibited the construction of plants to
make the TENS devices and prevented StimTech from entering promising foreign
markets. Id. The court concluded that this evidence was sufficient to establish that
Johnson & Johnson had intentionally suppressed StimTech. Id.
Furthermore, the court noted that by restraining StimTech, Johnson & John-
son had managed to suppress the entire TENS industry. Id. The development of
the TENS industry was in large part dependent on educating doctors about the
effectiveness of the devices and encouraging them to prescribe the TENS devices
rather than medication. Id. at 1334-35. Education, however, was extremely expen-
sive, and most of the other companies in the industry depended on StimTech to
educate doctors because StimTech was the only company with sufficient resources
to do so. Id.
Finally, the fact that StimTech remained in the TENS industry and actually
experienced sales growth did not prevent the court from finding that Johnson &
Johnson restrained competition. Id. at 1332. Johnson & Johnson's interests in-
cluded keeping StimTech in a dominant position in the industry, thereby allowing
Johnson &Johnson to control smaller competitors. Id. Moreover, had Johnson &
Johnson completely destroyed StimTech, the plaintiffs would have been free to
reenter the industry. Id. Thus, the court determined that it was in Johnson &
Johnson's best interest to keep StimTech alive, but not well. Id. The court con-
cluded by stating: "This court finds no difficulty with the jury's conclusion that the
defendant's acquisitions were taken with the intent to suppress competition within
the TENS industry." Id. at 1335.
214. Id. at 1337. The court relied on International Salt Co. v. United States,
332 U.S. 392 (1947), to find a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. In that
case, International Salt owned the patent for and leased two machines that process
salt products: the Lixator and the Saltomat. Id. at 394. International Salt was also
the country's largest producer of salt for industrial uses. The leases for the ma-
chines required lessees to purchase all unpatented salt and salt products for use
with their machines from International Salt. Id. Although the patents conferred a
monopoly on International Salt with regard to the machines, they did not allow
International Salt to control the trade of unpatented salt. Id. at 395-96. The Court
stated that by requiring the lessees to purchase salt from International Salt, they
restrained the salt market and foreclosed competition. Id. at 396. According to
the Court, "it is unreasonable per se to foreclose competitors from any substantial
market." Id. at 396.
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effects of the agreement in the relevant market.21 5
2. Johnson &Johnson as Liable Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act
According to the Supreme Court in McDonald, in order to pre-
vail on a charge of attempted monopolization under section 2 of
the Sherman Act, plaintiffs must show: (1) a dangerous probability
of success on the part of the defendant; (2) a specific intent to mo-
nopolize; and (3) anticompetitive conduct directed at an unlawful
purpose. 21 6
To establish a dangerous probability of success, a plaintiff must
usually show that the defendant has market power. In practice,
courts have been reluctant to find such power if the defendant's
market share is less than fifty percent.21 7 Johnson & Johnson ar-
gued that its thirty-seven percent share of the prescription pain con-
trol market and twenty-seven percent share of the over-the-counter
market, did not constitute sufficient market power to support a vio-
lation under section 2.218
The court rejected this argument and held that Johnson &
Johnson had much greater market power than market share figures
indicated.21 9 An important factor contributing to this power was
the high cost of gaining acceptance for a new drug or treatment,
which served as a substantial barrier to entry into the analgesic mar-
ket.220 Moreover, there was direct evidence that Johnson & John-
son priced its products significantly higher than did its competitors
for similar products and that this price differential was not attribu-
table to the superior quality of Johnson & Johnson drugs.221 The
ability of a seller to control price is the essence of market power.
The evidence ofJohnson &Johnson's ability to control price, taken
215. Had the case been analyzed under the rule of reason, the court's com-
ments suggest that Johnson & Johnson would have been found liable:
There is absolutely no evidence in the record to show that the suppres-
sion of TENS had any procompetitive or otherwise beneficial effects. In-
deed, the evidence is such that if TENS had not been suppressed, it could
have benefitted millions of people throughout the world .... There is
simply nothing thatJohnson andJohnson or any other defendant can say
in defense of acquiring and suppressing a product simply to eliminate a
competitive threat.
McDonald, 537 F. Supp. at 1338.
216. Id. at 1338.
217. Id. at 1334.
218. Id. at 1345-46.
219. Id.
220. For example, Johnson & Johnson spent over $13,000,000 in advertising
during the first year that Zomax was introduced. Id. at 1346.
221. Id.
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together with its substantial market share and the barriers to mar-
ket entry, was sufficient to support a finding of market power. The
specific intent requirement of section 2 of the Sherman Act was
inferred from Johnson & Johnson's attempts to suppress the devel-
opment of StimTech and sales of TENS technology. 22
II. LIMITATIONS OF ANTITRUST LAW
Antitrust law has traditionally been the legal mechanism for
ensuring that markets remain competitive. In the proprietary drug
industry, antitrust laws deter the deliberate misuse of patents as a
means of suppressing competition. They insure competition be-
tween pharmaceuticals by discouraging those who would obtain
patents by fraudulent means and use such patents to their eco-
nomic benefit. In addition, antitrust laws punish those who attempt
to extend the scope of patent monopolies through improper tying
arrangements, licensing restrictions, patent acquisitions or patent
pools.
Nevertheless, proprietary drugs are typically priced at ten to
twenty times the cost of production and, in some instances, appear
to be beyond the means of the people who need them most. In
order to understand why, we must consider the primary forces cre-
ating market power among drug products: inelasticity of demand
and barriers to market entry. 22 3
222. Id. at 1339-41. The district court denied Johnson &Johnson's motion
for a new trial and affirmed the jury's decision to award the plaintiffs $56,000,000
for the antitrust claims (before trebling), $25,000,000 in punitive damages and
another $12,000,000 on other claims. Id. at 1288-89. On appeal, the Eighth Cir-
cuit reversed the antitrust convictions on standing grounds. McDonald v. Johnson
& Johnson, 722 F.2d 1370, 1377 (8th Cir. 1983). The breach of contract ruling
against Johnson and Johnson was sustained for actual damages of $6,275,000. Pu-
nitive damages were found to have been based upon prejudicial argument and
evidence. A new trial was ordered on the issues of fraud and punitive damages. Id.
223. For a detailed discussion of the factors leading to market power in pro-
prietary drug products see, Michael A. Sanzo, Antitrust Law and Competition in the
Pharmaceutical Industry, 23 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. Rsv. 59, 68-74 (1991). Market
power is generally the result of two elements: inelasticity of demand and barriers
to competition. Id. at 68. Market power in the pharmaceutical industry, is affected
by three unique factors; (1) inherent inelasticity; (2) impediments to new product
development; and (3) market failure. Id. at 68-74. Inherent inelasticity refers to a
consumer's willingness to pay as much as he or she can afford when someone's life
or health is at stake. Id. at 70.
The second factor results from the two steps of drug development. Id. at 71-
72. The discovery phase of development identifies a possible new drug, which is
then patented. Id. The second phase of development, clinical studies, is equally
expensive and requires years of testing. Id. Once a patent is obtained, one drug
company can prevent others from developing the drug, without ever completing
phase two. As a result, the consumer never gets the drug. Id.
The third factor, market failure, occurs primarily because the person prescrib-
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A. Inelasticity of Demand
A manufacturer can only raise prices to the extent that con-
sumers consider his product to be uniquely desirable. In the drug
industry, inelasticity of demand arises from two factors. The first
factor is the nature of the products themselves. A person's ability to
function effectively on a day to day basis often depends upon the
availability and effectiveness of medications. Small differences be-
tween drug products are therefore accorded a disproportionately
large degree of significance. This may lead consumers to reject
products as effective substitutes for one another, thereby contribut-
ing to market power.224
The second factor contributing to inelasticity arises from the
peculiar fact that patients typically neither select nor directly pay
for medicine. Physicians usually decide what drugs will be pre-
scribed and a consideration of cost does not appear to be a major
factor influencing their decisions.225 Full or partial payment of the
cost of drugs by third party insurers encourages both patients and
physicians to spend without restraint. This aberrant situation has
long contributed to the bloated costs of American medicine.22 6
ing the medicine is not the person paying for it. Id. Doctors are often uninformed
about drug prices, and pharmacists often do not have the power to substitute lower
priced drugs for their more expensive counterparts. Id. at 74. Market failure is
magnified by the belief that a large insurance company, not a consumer, bears the
burden of paying for the drugs prescribed. Id.
224. The inherent inelasticity of pharmaceuticals is not necessarily an evil. It
provides exceptional rewards to companies that provide products perceived to be
of exceptional value. Thus, it encourages the development of competitive prod-
ucts where demand is greatest.
225. See Brian O'Reilly, Drugmakers, FORTUNE, July 29, 1991, at 48. Dr. Jerry
Avorn, associate professor at Harvard Medical School, noted that prices for drugs
are high because the individuals selecting the drugs are not the individuals who
actually pay for the drugs. Id. at 58. Furthermore, he noted that doctors were
swayed as much by sales pitches as they are by pharmacological data, and often
were uninformed about price. Id.; see also Sanzo, supra note 223, at 73 (remarking
that there can be no competition if there is no knowledge about price).
226. See Thomas L. Greaney, Competitive Reform in Health Care: The Vulnerable
Revolution, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 179, 182 (1988). Greaney noted a series of "firewalls"
that health care providers had managed to erect in order to protect themselves
from competition. Id. at 182. These include: maintaining professional discretion;
limiting the influence of third parties, like insurance companies; controlling the
division of labor; and a general lack of law enforcement of antitrust theories. Id.;
Clark C. Havighurst, The Changing Locus of Decision Making in the Health Care Sector,
11J. HEALTH POt. 697, 700 (1986) (developing idea that when health care industry
regulated itself costs were high); Charles D. Weller, "Free Choice" as a Restraint of
Trade in American Health Care Delivery and Insurance, 69 IOWA L. REv. 1351, 1376
(1984) (noting problem of lack of price competition in health care industry and
necessity of such competition for market success).
1994] 1255
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B. Barriers to Market Entry
Even if consumer demand for a product is highly inelastic,
market power cannot exist unless there is some barrier preventing
the entry of competing products into the market. Patents provide
one obvious example of barriers to market entry. Within the limits
described in this Article, however, patents are recognized as legiti-
mate by antitrust law. A patent confers upon its owner the right to
prevent competitors from manufacturing, using or selling the in-
vention defined by its claims. Arguably, the drug industry as we
know it, could not exist without such protection. It is unlikely that
a corporation would invest the $100-$200 million required to bring
a new drug to market227 if a competitor could then quickly copy
and sell the same product at a fraction of the cost. Thus, the contri-
butions that patents make to market power are offset by their con-
tribution to innovation.
Apart from patents, the costs associated with product develop-
ment are probably the biggest single barrier to market entry. These
costs are, to an extent, an inherent part of pharmaceutical products
and are offset by obvious benefits to consumers. It is less obvious,
however, that the distribution of these costs provides drug compa-
nies with an incentive to use patents solely to prevent new products
from coming to market.
The development of a new pharmaceutical product may be
viewed as taking place in four distinct phases: (1) initial observa-
tions; (2) structure determination; (3) large scale production; and
(4) clinical testing and commercial production. 228 Patents are typi-
cally obtained during the first or second phase, but the majority of
the costs come later. Reasonable estimates suggest that more than
half of the cost of drug development is the result of clinical test-
ing.229 As a result, a company marketing a drug uniquely suited to
227. See O'Reilly, supra note 225, at 58 (noting that producing successful new
drug costs approximately $200,000,000).
228. Michael A. Sanzo, Patenting Biotherapeutics, 20 HOFSTRA L. Riv. 387, 394-
97 (1991). The developmental process begins when a novel biological factor of
potential therapeutic value is observed: initial observation phase. Id. at 395. Next,
the structure of the factor is determined. Id. at 395-96. The time period between
when a factor is first observed and when its structure is determined can be quite
long. Id. To determine whether the invention will have any therapeutic value,
abundant quantities of the factor must be produced in order to test its effects in
animals: large scale production. Id. Finally, if a drug has made it through the first
three phases, it will be tested on humans and determinations will be made as to
whether it is an economically feasible alternative to other available alternatives:
clinical testing and commercial production. Id. at 397.
229. O'Reilly, supra note 225, at 58. Drug companies often talk about the
time and expense of producing a new drug. Id. Only 25% of most companies'
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the treatment of a particular condition (drug "A"), would have little
incentive to develop a second drug "B" for the same condition.
Even if B appeared to be clinically superior to A, it would not make
economic sense to pay for clinical testing. B's success would only
displace market share from the company's own product, drug A.
On the other hand, the company would clearly not want a competi-
tor to develop and market B. Therefore, a sensible strategy would
be to obtain a patent on B with as little work as possible and to use
this patent to prevent competitors from marketing B. Thus, a bar-
rier to competition would have been established with no offsetting
benefit to consumers.
III. REDUCING MARKET POWER IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
As previously discussed, antitrust law and patent law operate
together in the pharmaceutical market to achieve a balance be-
tween competition and innovation. This balance is distorted by
market power generated by inelasticity of demand and barriers to
market entry. Both inelasticity and barriers to entry are, to some
extent, an inherent part of drug products and cannot be changed.
Certain aspects of these factors, however, are not inherent and can
be limited by antitrust law or patent law.
A. Using Antitrust Law to Combat Market Failure
The absence of price competition among pharmaceuticals is a
reflection of the lack of price competition in the American health
care industry in general. 230 Historically, physicians have not consid-
ered cost when providing medical care or prescribing drugs.23 1
research and development funds go to finding a new product. Id. The majority of
the money is spent on three phases of testing involving patients, doctors and statis-
ticians. Id.
230. See generally CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, DEREGULATING THE HEALTH CARE IN-
DUSTRY 78-82 (1982) (stating that consumer ignorance about pricing allows physi-
cians to maintain monopolistic power and profits). The author states that lack of
knowledge about the quality and pricing of medical care furthers the inefficiencies
of the health service marketplace. Id. at 78. Because the consumer is unaware of
other prices for the same service, the physician is able to set whatever price he
deems reasonable. Id. at 79. State statutes, regulatory rules and professional ethics
have intensified consumer ignorance, rather than diminishing it, by preventing
disclosure of credentials and price. Id. at 82; see also Alain C. Enthoven, Health Care
Costs: Why Regulation Fails, Why Competition Works, How to Get There From Here, 11
NAT'LJ. 885, 885 (1979) (noting that health care systems rewards providers who
charge more, creating "cost increasing incentives").
231. Enthoven, supra note 230, at 885 (noting that physicians are rewarded by
increasing costs, not decreasing them); see also, Dr. Joseph M. Jadlow, Competition
and "Quality" in the Drug Industry: The 1962 Kefauver-Harris Drug Amendments as Bar-
riers to Entry, ANTrrRUsT L. & ECON. REV. 103, 105-06 (Winter 1971-72) (discussing
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Fortunately, medicine is rapidly becoming more competitive. 232
During the late 1970s and the 1980s, there was a proliferation of
prepaid medical plans and it appears that this trend is likely to con-
tinue in the future. 233 These plans appeal to employers and other
consumers by limiting medical costs. Prepaid medical plans in-
clude prepayment for prescription drugs, thereby creating an in-
centive at the administrative level to reduce the amount spent on
these products.
Not surprisingly, the trend toward competition has been
strongly opposed by medical groups intent upon maintaining the
profits of private physicians. Such groups were successful in
smothering a similar trend in the 1920s and 1930s.23 4 Antitrust law
and antitrust lawyers can help lower the cost of drugs and make
medical care more responsive to public need by ensuring that the
medical profession is not allowed to prevail a second time.2 35
generic versus brand name drugs). Dr. Jadlow notes the overwhelming theme in
this area as "few men are as careful of other men's money as their own." Id. at 105.
Because the chemical and generic names are often hard to remember, doctors
prescribe by brand name, thus ordering the more expensive drug. Id. at 105-06,
110.
232. Health care reform measures being considered by Congress could, po-
tentially, alter this situation.
233. See Clark C. Havighurst, The Professional Paradigm of Medical Care: Obstacles
to Decentralization, 30JURIMETRICSJ. 415, 416-17 (1990) (noting that employers, in-
surers and organized health plans have become more active in balancing benefits
of health care with costs); Weller, supra note 226, at 1372-75 (analyzing restructure
of health care industry).
234. See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE
198-232 (1982). During the 1920s and 1930s, the medical profession successfully
shaped the medical system so that "professional sovereignty" emerged intact. Id. at
232. The medical community achieved this result by controlling the development
of technology and the division of labor and choosing the present organizational
form. Id. As technology advanced, X-ray machines were invented, anesthesia be-
came more prevalent, and laboratories expanded, the issue arose as to whether
doctors were necessary for these jobs. Id. at 220-21. While skilled non-physicians
were allowed to perform some of these tasks, it was established that the physician
had to interpret results and consult with patients. Id. Doctors successfully resisted
the emergence of the corporate form in their practice because they wanted to
prevent a third party from controlling their actions and sharing their profits. Id. at
215-17. All of these actions allowed physicians to retain control over the medical
profession. Id. at 232; see also Weller, supra note 226, at 1361. The emergence of
the prepaid plans was the result of several aspects of society in the late 1920s and
early 1930s. Id. These "insurance" plans were perceived as a threat by the hospi-
tals and the medical profession as a whole. Id. at 1364.
235. The battle against monopolistic practices in medicine is a complex topic
beyond the scope of this Article. For a complete discussion of the battle against
monopolistic practices in medicine, see Greaney, supra note 226, at 180-84 (dis-
cussing role of litigation and legislation in promoting competition in health care
industry); Havighurst, supra note 226, at 698, 708 (noting shift of decision-making,
which was entirely dominated by medical profession, back to consumers them-
selves as method for generating competition); Weller, supra note 226, at 1352-55
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B. Using Patent Law to Promote New Product Development of
Compulsory Patent Licensing
A patent may be thought of as a contract in which the govern-
ment grants exclusivity to an inventor in exchange for the disclo-
sure of his invention. The intellectual property created by a patent
differs from ordinary property in that it consists of an intangible
concept, not the embodiment of a concept. Thus, everyone other
than the patentee is prohibited from making, using or selling an
invention solely because the patentee conceived of it first.
The justification for the government granting such broad pro-
tection is that patents ultimately benefit society by encouraging the
proliferation of innovative products. Thus, the patent contract car-
ries with it an implied duty to make patented inventions, or at least
those for which there is significant consumer demand, available to
the public.236 In opposition to this, the structure of research costs
encourages companies with a dominant market position to acquire
patents on drugs that have not yet undergone clinical testing and to
use these patents to block competition.
(remarking on change from idea that competition is "unworkable" in health care
industry to the emergence of "pro-competition" strategies).
236. The Supreme Court has held that a patent holder does not have an obli-
gation to use his or her patent. Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag
Co., 210 U.S. 405, 428-30 (1908). Eastern Paper Bag sued for an injunction be-
cause of infringement of its patent on a paper bag machine patent by Continental
Paper Bag Company. Id. at 406. The defendant alleged that the patent had never
been used, and that it was inequitable to suppress a useful business from exploiting
a patent under such circumstances. Id. The Court noted that many of the circuit
courts of appeal had granted injunctions to companies whose patents had been
infringed, even if the company was not using the patent. Id. at 426. The defend-
ant attempted to distinguish "non-use" from "long and unreasonable non-use." Id.
at 427. The Court, however, determined that non-use by Eastern Paper Bag was
not unreasonable, for it would have increased costs to develop a new machine. Id.
at 429. The Court held that Congress had selected a policy of patents not being
affected by non-use for many years, and the policy "has demonstrated its wisdom
and beneficial effect on the arts and sciences." Id. at 428-29. The injunction was
affirmed. Id. But see Special Equip. Co. v. Coe, Comm'r of Patents, 324 U.S. 370,
378-79 (noting that Supreme Court has routinely held that "failure of the patentee
to make use of a patented invention does not affect the validity of the patent");
Vitamin Technologists, Inc. v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Found., 146 F.2d 941,
952-53 (9th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 876 (1945). Wisconsin Alumni Re-
search Foundation sued Vitamin Technologists, Inc., for injunctive relief for in-
fringing one of its three patents for a process for making Vitamin D. Id. at 942.
The Ninth Circuit held that the refusal to use the patent to irradiate oleomarga-
rine, and thus aid the poor who suffered from rickets, violated public policy. Id. at
943, 956. The court stated that "such refusal to permit such irradiation warrants
the refusal of the equitable injunction." Id.; see also Allied Research Prods. Co. v.
Heatbath Corp., 300 F. Supp. 656, 657 (N.D. fI1. 1969) ("An owner of a patent
cannot assert his rights under the law and Constitution if such owner refuses to
make use of a patent.").
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By suppressing innovation and impeding public access to new
products, 23 7 blocking patents act contrary to the basic rationale un-
derlying the patent system. 238 This could be rectified through laws
requiring patent holders, who fail to market their invention within
a reasonable period, 239 to license the rights to the invention upon
demand.240
Compulsory licensing laws are common in countries other
than the United States, 241 and a theoretical basis for such provisions
may be found in American patent law itself.2 4 2 Section 102(g) of
237. It can, of course, be argued that the patent has secured for the public
free use of the invention upon expiration of the patent term. This only benefits
society, however, if someone else would not have made the same invention during
this period. Importantly, many companies often actively pursue the same inven-
tions using essentially the same methods. This is particularly true for the most
promising inventions of biotechnology. In such situations, each of the competing
parties will likely obtain the product being pursued within a short time of one
another.
238. See, e.g., Mason v. Hepburn, 13 App. D.C. 86 (1834). According to the
Mason court:
[T]he inventor who designedly... withholds his invention from the pub-
lic, comes not within the policy or object of the Constitution or acts of
Congress. He does not promote and, if aided in his design, would im-
pede the progress of science and the useful arts; and with a very bad
grace could he apply for favor or protection to that society which ... he
certainly had neither benefitted nor intended to benefit.
Id. (quoting Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 322, 327-28 (1858)).
239. Evidence of a good faith effort to develop or market the invention might
be sufficient to preclude compulsory licensing.
240. Such laws already exist for patents obtained as the result of federally
funded research. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-211 (1988) (defining patent rights when
invention is made with federal assistance). In particular, § 203 provides:
(1) With respect to any subject invention in which a small business firm
or nonprofit organization has acquired title under this chapter, the Fed-
eral agency . . . shall have the right . . . to require the contractor, an
assignee or exclusive licensee of a subject invention to grant a nonexclu-
sive, partially exclusive, or exclusive license ... to a responsible applicant
or applicants ... if the Federal agency determines that such-
(a) action is necessary because the contractor or assignee has not
taken, or is not expected to take within a reasonable time, effective
steps to achieve practical application of the subject invention.
Id. § 203. In principle, there is no reason why these laws could not be extended to
patents in general.
241. See David J. Henry, Multinational Practice in Determining Provisions in Com-
pulsoy Patent Licenses, 11 J. IrT'L L. & ECON. 325, 325 (1976). Most countries have
adopted either the "patent approach" or the "misuse approach" to compulsory
patent licenses. Id. Under the patent approach, there is a positive limit on the
rights bestowed by the patent at the time of issuance. Id. Under the misuse ap-
proach, a country grants a license as a potential remedy when a patent is misused.
Id. The United Kingdom, Canada and France all have compulsory patent licenses
dealing with the pharmaceutical industry. Id. at 338, 345. While Japan and Ger-
many have laws defining the granting of compulsory licenses, none have actually
been granted. Id. at 346-48.
242. Compulsory licensing laws have been approved in the United States for
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the Patent Act provides that an inventor may lose the right to prior-
ity by abandoning, suppressing or concealing an invention or by
failing to use reasonable diligence in pursuing the invention.2 43 If
suppression of an invention is sufficient grounds for the denial of
rights before a patent is granted, it should carry the same conse-
quence after the patent is granted. A patent is not an end in itself,
but rather, a set of rights granted in the expectation that they will
lead to inventions being made available to consumers.
Compulsory patent laws may be considered analogous to the
remedy of specific performance, provided patent holders are justly
compensated and receive a fair opportunity to work their invention
themselves. Such laws compel the patent holder to fulfill the pat-
ent contract obligations of promoting science and the useful arts.
Ultimately, compulsory licensing laws should lead to both lower
drug prices and an increase in the number of competitive products
being marketed.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the proprietary drug industry, antitrust laws act at the
boundary of patent monopolies. They help to insure that patents
do not limit competition between drug products more than is war-
ranted by the underlying objective of promoting innovation. Anti-
trust law can do more to control drug prices by helping to open the
health care market to providers that compete based on price. Pat-
ent law can also help to promote competition among drugs by re-
moving incentives for companies to obtain patents for the sole
purpose of preventing products from coming to market.
patents in a few fields. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2402 (1988) (noting that "[t]he breeder
of any novel variety of sexually reproduced plant . . . shall be entitled to plant
variety protection"); 42 U.S.C. § 2184 (1988) (dealing with patents for atomic and
nuclear energy); and 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (1988) (providing for mandatory licensing
for air pollution technology).
243. The Patent Act provides:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless-
(g) before the applicant's invention thereof, the invention was made in
this country by another who had not abandoned, suppressed or con-
cealed it. In determining priority of invention, there shall be considered
not only the respective dates of conception and reduction to practice of
the invention, but also the reasonable diligence of one who was the first
to conceive and the last to reduce to practice.
35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1988).
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